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This paper examines theimplementation of a quasi-commercialland use system on newly acquired
municipal commonage in Leliefontein, a
former ‘coloured reserve’ in Namaqualand,
Northern Cape. This land has been acquired
ostensibly for use by all of the reserve’s
residents. A Commonage Committee made
up of community members and state
representatives has been set up to manage
this land on behalf of the municipality. After
describing the management framework that
has been put in place, this paper investigates
how the implementation of this framework is
actually unfolding on the ground. This
investigation is based on fieldwork
undertaken in Leliefontein over the course of
2003 and the first half of 2004.
What the investigation shows is that the
newly acquired commons of Leliefontein are
being monopolised by larger and better-
resourced reserve farmers to the exclusion of
others. This group also dominates the
Commonage Committee which manages
these lands. Moreover, there is a growing
disjuncture between the rules and regulations
governing land use as set out in the formal
management plan and grazing regulations,
and the actual practices pursued by these
farmers.
Of significance, given the concerns
around rangeland degradation that informed
the adoption of the current land use approach
on the new commons, is the fact that pre-set
stocking rates are not being adhered to, and
the management institution is unable or
unwilling to enforce these. This is due to a
lack of capacity, resources and will on the
part of the co-management institution. It is
argued that it is not in the interest of the
management institution, constituted of the
beneficiaries of the new commons, to act
against their own self-interest.
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Bounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the west
and by the Gariep River to the north (which is
the border with Namibia), Namaqualand is a
vast, sparsely populated and semi-arid/arid
region in the Northern Cape province of
South Africa.1 The regional economy is
dominated by mining and agriculture
(particularly small stock farming), although
tourism has grown significantly over the past
decade . High levels of plant diversity and
endemism in the region and associated spring
flowers are fuelling the growth of this sector
(Todd et al., 1998).
1. Introduction
Map 1: The coloured communal areas of the Namaqualand region of the Namakwa district of
the Northern Cape province (*This map is not to scale)
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The Namaqualand region is home to six
‘coloured’ communal areas – reserves that
were set aside for exclusive occupation by
people classified as coloured by the former
apartheid regime (Boonzaier, 1987; Smith,
1989; Krohne & Steyn, 1991). Leliefontein is
one of these communal areas.2 These areas
comprise some 1.7 million ha of land or 27
per cent of the Namaqualand region, and
accommodate approximately 40 per cent of
the region’s population (Rohde et al., 2001).
On the whole, Namaqualand is peripheral to
the broader national economy, and lags behind
the national and provincial averages as
reflected in human development indices –
0.428 for Namaqualand as opposed to 0.677
nationally, and 0.698 for the Northern Cape
province. The human development index for
the coloured population of Namaqualand is
substantially lower at 0.340 (Rohde et al.,
2003).
These communal areas had their origins as
mission stations in the early to mid-1800s.
The missions provided refuge to indigenous
people from encroachment by European
pastoralists (Penn, 1986; Boonzaier, 1987). In
the case of Leliefontein, the mission station
was established in 1824 at what is now
Leliefontein village (de Swardt, 1993; Rohde
et al., 1999).
Since the creation of the Namaqualand
reserves, there have been ongoing attempts by
the state to transform the communal nature of
tenure and land use prevailing in these areas.
Leliefontein was not excluded from these
efforts. The authority of indigenous leaders
was undermined and replaced by missionary
and later state control. Sedentarisation and
villagisation were encouraged, and restrictions
were placed on agriculture through enforcing
conditions of access to the commons
(Marinus, 1998). The 1963 Rural Areas Act
divided the reserves into residential and
agricultural zones, and provided for the sub-
division and ultimate titling and allocation of
communal rangeland to ‘bona fide’ reserve
farmers only (Boonzaier, 1987; Archer et al.,
1989; SPP, 1990; Krohne & Steyn, 1991;
Marinus, 1998; Rohde et al., 1999).
Following amendment in 1979, the provisions
of the 1963 Act were implemented under the
so-called ‘economic units’ policy in three of
Box 1: The Leliefontein Reserve
Leliefontein is the southernmost Namaqualand reserve and comprises approximately
190 000 ha (Krohne & Steyn, 1991). The reserve is bisected from north to south by the N7
national road. There are ten settlements in the reserve, with seven of these on the eastern side
of the N7. The village of Leliefontein (which is on the eastern side) is the largest and oldest
of these settlements. The reserve is divided into village commons associated with each of the
settlements. The boundaries between these village commons are not rigidly defined,
comprising instead a boundary zone that is permeable and flexible. There are instances of
herds from the Leliefontein village common moving onto parts of the Paulshoek common at
certain times of the year. There are also cases of permanent relocations between settlements.
Leliefontein is an arid to semi-arid area with annual rainfall of 100 to 350 mm (Krohne &
Steyn, 1991; Meadows, 1985; Penn, 1986). Most of the reserve receives winter rainfall,
although the eastern plateau region bordering on Bushmanland receives rainfall in summer as
well (Krohne and Steyn, 1991). The eastern border of the Leliefontein reserve is thus in the
transition zone between the winter-rainfall Kamiesberg and the summer-rainfall
Bushmanland region. Rainfall is on the whole seasonally unreliable and highly variable, but
particularly so in the transition zone with Bushmanland (Meadows, 1985).
The Leliefontein reserve falls within the Kamiesberg local municipality, which is one of six
local municipalities making up the larger Namakwa district municipality.
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Namaqualand’s communal areas in 1984 –
Steinkopf, the southern part of the
Richtersveld reserve and Leliefontein3 (Archer
et al., 1989; Smith, 1989). These three
reserves were deemed large enough by the
authorities to subdivide into economically-
viable farming units (Krohne & Steyn, 1991).
The overall trend in transformation since
the early 1900s in particular has thus been
toward greater co-option and control by the
state over residents of these communal areas
through formalisation and regularisation of
settlement, land use and land management,
and ultimately enclosure and privatisation of
the commons (Boonzaier et al., 1987; Archer,
et al., 1989; Krohne & Steyn, 1991; de
Swardt, 1993; Marinus, 1998; Rohde et al.,
1999). These interventions were motivated in
terms of a perceived ‘tragedy of the
commons’, stemming directly from communal
farming practices (Boonzaier, 1987; Marinus,
1998). Communal farmers were seen as
irresponsible ‘free-riders’ whose striving to
maximise individual gain had given rise to
severe overstocking and consequent
overgrazing (Smith, 1989; Rohde et al.,
1999). Converting communal tenure to
individualised land holdings, it was argued,
would limit farming to bona fide farmers, thus
reducing stock numbers and making
individual users more responsible for the
management and control of their individual
holdings (Krohne & Steyn, 1991; Rohde, et
al., 1999). This privatisation of the commons
was also aimed at benefiting and maintaining
an emerging coloured middle-class in the
Namaqualand reserves as part of the apartheid
state’s overall strategy of co-option (Marinus,
1998).
Many reserve residents resisted these
attempts at transformation, particularly
enclosure and privatisation of the commons.
Court action by residents of the three
Namaqualand reserves where privatisation
was attempted in the 1980s ultimately halted
these developments (Archer, et al., 1989; SPP,
1990; Krohne & Steyn, 1991; Marinus,
1998). As a result of this resistance, these
areas effectively retained their communal
nature into the post-1994 democratic
dispensation.
Post-1994 land reform in
Namaqualand
Land reform in relation to the Namaqualand
communal areas has, however, continued in
the post-1994 period. With the demise of
apartheid, representatives from ten
Namaqualand communities met in Steinkopf
in mid-1994 to discuss how their need for
additional land and effective and equitable
management of the existing communal areas
could be addressed through the new
democratic government’s land reform
programme (Wellman, 2000).4 Deliberations
on the nature of land reform in Namaqualand
were taken forward through the 1997
Namaqualand District Planning Project (SPP,
2003). This district planning exercise involved
municipalities, commonage users and land
rights and legal NGOs, specifically the
Surplus Peoples Project (SPP) and the Legal
Resources Centre (LRC) (Pienaar & May,
2003). This planning exercise was aimed at
developing an approach and strategy for land
reform in Namaqualand (SPP, 2003), and also
to investigate how to ‘refine and better
redirect options for land management and
institutional support’ (Pienaar & May, 2003:
3) on the commons of Namaqualand.
Given that the restitution of dispossessed
land is not an option in Namaqualand since
land dispossessions took place prior to 1913,5
the current reform process is focussed on
tenure reform of the reserve areas, and
extension of the reserves through land
redistribution in the form of new municipal
commonage. The fact that the current round
of reforms include the acquisition of
additional land to expand the land base of the
communal areas, set these apart from
initiatives of the past which focussed solely on
changing tenure relations within the existing
reserves. In the case of Leliefontein, this
newly acquired land is directly adjacent to the
reserve.6
The tenure reform component is being
undertaken in terms of the Transformation of
Certain Rural Areas Act no. 94 of 1998
(TRANCRAA), and addresses the transfer of
ownership of the reserve areas from the
Minister of Land Affairs (who currently holds
4
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the land in trust for the residents) to either
local municipalities, a Communal Property
Association (CPA)7, or any other legal entity
approved by the Minister. According to the
Act, transfer of ownership can only take place
once the Minister is satisfied that relevant by-
laws (in the case of a municipality) or rules
and regulations (in the event of an association
or other legal entity) are in place to provide
for a balance between security of tenure and
the protection of use rights by the community
and individual community members, including
the rights of future users (TRANCRAA,
1998, section 2). By including future users,
the need to ensure sustainable use of the
commons through these laws, rules and
regulations is implied. In Leliefontein, the
TRANCRAA process has thus involved the
surveying of arable allotments; documenting
of existing rights; counting of stock; drafting
of municipal grazing regulations; and the
development of a new commonage
management plan.
As of the beginning of 2004, the
TRANCRAA process was still ongoing in
Namaqualand. In November 2002, referenda
were held in five of the six Namaqualand’s
communal areas to elicit the opinions of
residents on the land ownership options
provided for in the Act.8 A report on the
outcome of these referenda has been submitted
to the Minister by SPP and LRC. In the case
of Leliefontein, the majority of voters opted
for municipal ownership. To date, however,
the Minister has made no decision and thus
the status quo in land ownership remains.
The redistribution component of the
current reform initiative is being undertaken
through the Municipal Commonage
Programme – a part of the Department of
Land Affair’s redistribution programme - and
involves the acquisition of white commercial
farms either adjacent or near to the
Namaqualand communal areas. Although
ownership of this land is vested in
municipalities, the land is acquired
specifically for use by reserve residents and is
held in trust on their behalf. In the case of
Leliefontein, the redistribution component has
involved the acquisition of a number of
properties directly abutting the eastern edge of
the reserve.
Box 2: Trusteeship and management responsibility in the communal areas of
Namaqualand
Trusteeship for the communal areas has changed a number of times over the past century
(Marinus, 1998).
In the early 1980s, trusteeship was vested in the Department of Local Government, Housing
and Agriculture of the coloured House of Representatives. With the demise of apartheid in
1994, trusteeship shifted to the Minister of Land Affairs.
In the pre-1994 period, local management boards were responsible for allocating
occupational and use rights and for resource management in these areas. The boards were
also responsible for providing and maintaining infrastructure on the commons. The
jurisdictional boundaries of these boards corresponded to the boundaries of the communal
areas. In 1995 the boards were replaced by democratically elected Transitional Local
Councils (TLCs).
The TLCs took over the responsibilities and functions of the management boards in relation
to the commons, and until 2000 the jurisdictional boundaries continued to match those of the
communal areas. After the 2000 local government elections, however, the new local
municipalities replaced the TLCs. The boundaries of the new municipalities no longer match
those of the communal areas, now being much larger and incorporating both communal land
and surrounding commercial farms.
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A central aspect of the municipal
commonage programme is the design of
appropriate management systems for the new
properties. In the case of Leliefontein, this has
been undertaken concurrently with the
TRANCRAA process. As a result, a single set
of grazing regulations and a single
management plan have been developed which,
on paper at least, applies to both the old
commons and the new farms. As of early
2004, however, neither the grazing regulations
nor the management plan were being applied
on the old commons, but only on the new
farms (and here very selectively, as discussed
below). Only once ownership of the reserve
land is resolved will implementation of the
management system on the old commons be
considered.
The focus of this paper is mainly on the
land redistribution component of the current
reforms. The ongoing TRANCRAA process
will only be addressed in so far as it is
relevant to the newly acquired farms.
Objectives and motivations for
the current reforms
The aims of national municipal commonage
policy are clear, although as this case study
will illustrate, poorly conceived. According to
national Municipal Commonage Policy
(Department of Land Affairs, (DLA) 2000),
the aims of acquiring municipal commonage
through the programme are:
1. To provide access to land for subsistence
farmers for supplementing income and to
provide for household consumption, and;
2. To provide a ‘stepping-stone’ for emergent
farmers in their gradual transition from
subsistence to semi-commercial and
commercial farmers.
In the principles outlined in the policy, it is
stated that municipal commonage projects
should preferably incorporate both subsistence
and emergent commercial farmers.
The policy prescribes that ownership of
land acquired through the programme be
vested in local municipalities, and that the
land be made available to local residents on a
lease basis. The policy also stipulates that a
management committee be established to
administer and monitor the use of this land.
Standard notarial deeds that the DLA attaches
to the titles of property acquired through the
programme reinforce and elaborate these
general policy requirements. The policy
further states that the management committee
for land acquired through the programme
should be representative in nature (i.e. include
the user group) and be responsible, in
partnership with the municipality, for
developing and implementing rules to ensure
efficient and effective land use (DLA, 2000).
In the unfolding of this policy in
Leliefontein, however, the aims and
motivations on the part of local stakeholders
(such as the municipality, NGOs and some
farmers) are more nuanced and value-laden.
On the one hand, the livelihood objectives as
encapsulated in national policy are not
contested and there is general consensus that
the new farms should contribute toward the
development of farmers in Leliefontein. On
the other hand, the nature of this development,
the farmers to be targeted, and the way that
the new farms are to be used in supporting
these farmers, is still informed by certain
long-standing biases and narratives.
Thus, implicitly at least, the concern of
degradation of the commons through
overstocking and problematic communal
farming practices remains – the Leliefontein
commons are still typified by some key
stakeholders as being hopelessly overstocked
(hopeloos oorbelaai) (SPP, 2003: 28). This
concern with degradation of the commons has
strongly informed the land use model that has
been adopted for the new farms (and by way
of note, deliberations on the future
management of the reserve commons as well).
A further and related concern, particularly
on the part of NGOs, and one that applies to
many other situations of group land holding,
is how to hold members of groups accountable
for their individual use of group resources,
and in particular, how to enforce the
regulations that govern group resources.
Group land holding institutions are often not
legally robust enough to do this. In the context
of land redistribution in Namaqualand, this
concern on the part of NGO stakeholders in
particular, stems from the problems
experienced with CPAs established as group
6
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land holding entities through the Settlement
and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) of the
land redistribution programme and through
land restitution projects (Pienaar & May,
2003). Many of the approximately 550 CPAs
established since the mid-1990s are plagued
by problems of inequitable resource access
and legally insecure rights on the part of
group members (Anderson & Pienaar, 2003).
A further concern with CPAs is that the state,
as a private land ownership entity, will not
invest in development of such land in practice.
Thus, the development of roads, other
infrastructure and maintenance, for example,
would become the responsibility of the CPA
as it would with any other private landowner.
It seems, implicitly at least, that these
concerns with group land-holding entities, and
in particular CPAs, informed the choice of the
municipal commonage redistribution route for
Namaqualand. Redistribution could have been
pursued via the SLAG option, with group
land holding through CPAs as an alternative.
By redistributing land into municipal
ownership however, state investment on
private land is no longer an issue.9 Moreover,
in managing the land, the municipality has the
force of law behind it in the ability to draft
municipal by-laws and regulations – and thus
in theory should prove legally robust enough
to hold individual users to account.
Theories and practices of
natural resource management
Since 1994, on the surface at least, there has
been a shift in approach to the commons of
Namaqualand, after having been dominated
for decades by traditional ‘tragedy of the
commons’ thinking and associated policy
prescriptions of enclosure and
individualisation. The solution to the problem
of the commons of Namaqualand has
traditionally been seen as the elimination of
communal tenure. Under the current
dispensation, however, and in line with a
growing body of work critical of the
privatisation approach and which provides an
alternative understanding of common
property, a more positive outlook for the
prospects of community management of land
has been adopted. Community control is no
longer seen as necessarily being incompatible
with sustainable land use and management.
The approach that is currently being
adopted in Namaqualand, therefore, retains
communal ownership of land, yet has a strong
focus on the definition of property rights, the
creation of institutions to involve users in
resource management, and the formulation of
rules and regulations regarding resource
access and rates of use and extraction. The
new approach encapsulates many of the
design principles promoted by ‘new
institutionalist’ thinking. These design
principles define the ideal configuration for
common property resource institutions. Thus,
effective management of common property is
seen to depend on a clearly bounded and
relatively homogenous user group; clear rules
of operation; collective decision-making; overt
monitoring; and clearly agreed upon and
applied sanctions (Ostrom, 1992).
This new institutionalist approach is,
however, not without its critics. Two concerns
are highlighted. In the first place, the
emphasis on rules and regulations provides
too narrow a focus for understanding social
dynamics, and has the effect of erasing the
social and cultural dynamics inherent in
institutions’ operations (Scoones, 1994).
Overemphasising rules and regulations in
natural resource management serves to
obscure the real power dynamics involved in
resource use and development (Peters, 2002).
Similarly, the design principles are abstracted
and fail to take into account the dynamic
complexity of communities. In particular,
rural communities are rarely homogenous
entities and instead are highly differentiated in
terms of class, ethnicity, gender and age
(Toulmin and Quan, 2000). This
differentiation influences the degree and type
of participation possible by different groups
within communities, and determines which
voices are heard, and which groupings benefit
(Peters, 2002).
In the crafting of resource management
institutions in Namaqualand, these concerns
with ‘new institutionalist’ thinking are
acknowledged, if only in part. Adopting a co-
management approach involving
municipalities (i.e. local state structures) in
7
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partnership with elected community-based
organisations in the management of the
commons, is hoped will mediate some of the
dynamics associated with resource
management at a local community level. The
municipality can act as a neutral arbiter that
is separate from and above community
politics in decision-making on resource access
and management. This should foster increased
control over resources and regulative
institutions by community groups that are
currently excluded, and thus avoid a situation
where control of resources and institutions is
the exclusive domain of local elites. The state
as co-manager also helps to ensure the
enforcement of rules and regulations, and
protecting the rights of individual members
within groups.
Despite the retention of communal
ownership of the commons, under the current
round of reforms, however, the
individualisation paradigm continues to exert
a strong influence. Thus, although
communally-owned, the newly acquired farms
are to be managed as individualised leasehold
schemes, with camps on these farms
effectively being leased out to individual or
small groups of farmers. It seems, therefore,
that the attractive simplicity with which the
‘tragedy of the commons’ model explains
observable environmental problems on the old
commons continues to exert an appeal to
stakeholders. This appears particularly true
where the individualisation paradigm
intersects with the interests of people who can
benefit from dismantling the commons, or
from the introduction of non-communal forms
of tenure (a theme that features prominently in
this case study).
Structure of the paper
The case study starts with a description of the
new farms, before sketching the management
approach and framework that has been
adopted in relation to this land. The remainder
of the study examines actual practices on the
part of the management institutions and
among farmers as emerging on the new farms.
The paper closes with a short discussion and
conclusion.
Endnotes
1 The Namaqualand region makes up the western
half of the Namakwa District Municipality.
2 In addition to Leliefontein, the other reserves in
Namaqualand are Pella, Concordia, Richtersveld,
Steinkopf and Kommaggas.
3 The Policy was also implemented in the Mier
reserve, which lies outside of the Namaqualand
region.
4 The post-1994 land reform programme comprises
three components: The restitution of land rights
(that is rights in land lost after 1913); land
redistribution; and land tenure reform.
5 In terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act no.
22 of 1994, the process of land restitution will only
address claims for land dispossessed after June
1913.
6 For the purposes of this paper, the newly acquired
commons are referred to as the ‘new farms’. The
original communal areas are referred to as the ‘old
commons’ (or in some cases the ‘reserve
commons’).
7 A Communal Property Association (CPA) is a legal
entity created to own land on behalf of a defined
group of members. CPAs are established in terms
of the Communal Property Association Act no. 28
of 1996. CPAs are a new form of tenure created
through the current land reform programme, and
were envisaged as a more appropriate structure
than existing legal entities for group land holding,
such as trusts and closed corporations (Hall, et al.,
2003).
8 No referendum was held in Kommaggas. The local
residents association argues that TRANCRAA is
misplaced since it assumes state ownership of the
land. The Association is of the opinion that the
community has group title granted to them in the
19th century by the governor of the Cape Colony
and the Queen (Wisborg and Rohde, 2003).
9 Although, as will be noted in the case below, other
issues such as the ability of the state to invest
come to the fore.
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This case study is based on five fieldvisits to Leliefontein undertaken over2003 and the first half of 2004.
During these visits interviews were carried out
with communal farmers, municipal officials,
and with officials from the Department of
Agriculture in Springbok. Discussions were
also held with individuals at SPP and LRC.
The proceedings of a number of Commonage
Committee meetings were observed, and
similarly the proceedings of a local farmers
association meeting. A full list of the
respondents involved in this study is provided
at the end of the report.
Description of the new farms
The ‘new farms’ of Leliefontein
Between 1998 and 2000, five separate
properties – namely De Riet 1 and De Riet 2,
Papkuilsfontein, Boesmanplaat, and
Tweefontein – totalling some 33 000 ha of
land, were acquired from white commercial
farmers on the eastern border of Leliefontein
(see Map 2). This process of acquiring land to
expand the Leliefontein commons is ongoing.10
This case study is restricted to the five
properties acquired between 1998 and 2000.
Of the five farms acquired by 2000, title
deeds for three of the properties were
transferred in August of 1998. Titles for the
remaining two properties were transferred in
November 2000.
Information on the five new farms is
summarised in Table 1.
These new farms are all located in the
transition zone between the winter rainfall
Kamiesberg and the summer rainfall
Bushmanland region. Although annual rainfall
for this area is low and highly variable, in
good years the new farms receive both winter
and summer rain. Compared to the
Kamiesberg (areas such as Leliefontein village
and Paulshoek), the new farms are far less
mountainous and incised. The vegetation is
also different, with grasslands predominating in
many parts of the new farms, unlike the
reserve commons which largely comprise
succulent and shrub-based vegetation.
The five new farms are divided into a total of
66 camps, ranging in size from 36 to 2199 ha.
Seventeen of the 66 camps (25.8%) are less
than 250 ha in extent; 21 of the camps
(31.2%) are between 250 and 500 ha in
extent, and a further 16 (24.2%) are between
500 and 750 ha. Less than 20% of the camps
(12 of 66 camps) are bigger than 750 ha. The
camps on the new farms are the same as those
used by the commercial farmers who
previously owned this land. The distribution
of camp sizes on each of the new farms is
indicated in Table 2. In 2003, dedicated
camps for rams were set-aside on at least two
of the farms (Boesmanplaat and Tweefontein).
By 2004, however, there were no longer ram
camps on any of the farms.
The boundaries of the individual farms
acquired through the municipal commonage
programme have been retained, as have the
camps within each of the new farms. As will
be shown in the sections that follow, the farms
2. Case study of the newly
acquired farms of Leliefontein
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Map 2: The Kamiesberg Municipality indicating the Leliefontein Communal Area and the five
newly acquired farms discussed in this case study (A, B, C, D, E on the map)
and camps are important management units
under the framework governing the use of the
new farms.
The officially specified carrying capacity
being used in the management of the farms is
ten hectares per small stock unit. Therefore,
approximately 3300 small stock units could
be accommodated on the new farms.
Table 1: Summary of information on the New Farms
Farm name and number Year of Transfer Size in ha11
Title Deed Dpt of Agric
Portion 1 of De Riet (farm number 383) 1998 3426.1 3443
Portion 2 of De Riet (farm number 383) 1998 2384.8 2379
Papkuilsfontein (farm number 363) 1998 5060.4 5060
Boesmanplaat (farm number 365) 2000 6956 6956
Remainder of Tweefontein (farm number 248) 2000 14799.9 1571712
TOTAL 32 618.4 33 555
Sources: Department of Agriculture, 1972, 1989, 1997, 2001, undated; Legal Resources Centre, 2003
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Table 2: The distribution of camps and camp sizes on the new farms
Land acquisition process
According to the Municipal Commonage
Policy, beneficiary communities are required
to initiate the process of acquiring land.
Communities need to articulate a clear
demand for land and should be proactive in
identifying available land in their area and in
initiating negotiations of sale. In the case of
some of the farms purchased for Leliefontein,
individual members from the village
Commonage Committees played a prominent
role in the acquisition process. According to
an official from the Department of Agriculture
(DoA), in the case of the De Riet farms, the
convenor of the Paulshoek Commonage
Committee undertook initial negotiations with
the previous owner. The process was later
taken over by the DoA in Springbok.
Land acquisition for purposes of extending
the land base of the Leliefontein reserve has
been restricted to the eastern side of the N7
national road, which roughly cuts the reserve
in half from north to south. According to
municipal officials and community members,
there are a number of reasons for this.13
In the first place, aggressive land
acquisition by South African National Parks
for the establishment of the Namaqualand
National Park has effectively crowded out
land acquisitions for land reform through
pushing up land prices on the western side of
the N7 national road. The Department of
Land Affairs, in financing land acquisition,
works strictly on what is determined to be the
market value of land. The market value of
land in the region varies between R100 and
R170 per hectare. According to the municipal
development officer, if the price is ‘one cent
more than that (the market value) … they
(DLA) are not interested’ (personal
communication, 17 November 2003). Rigid
adherence to market value in land acquisition
is not restricted to Namaqualand, but applies
to all land acquisition for land reform
purposes. In the Hantam Karoo for example,
farm sales fell though because the selling
price was R5.00 per hectare above what the
DLA considered to be the market value of the
land (Tilley, 2003). It is alleged by the
municipality that land for conservation
purposes, which is not restricted in this way,
is being purchased at up to twice the price
offered by Land Affairs.14
A second factor that is relevant in the
central Kamiesberg, which is comparatively
well-watered in relation to Namaqualand
generally, is that farms rarely come onto the
open market. The few land transfers that do
take place in the area tend to be within
families, or are ‘closed’ sales between
neighbours or acquaintances. This has proved
a major obstacle to land acquisition in the
central Kamiesberg area. Moreover, when
farms do come onto the market, because this
Name No. of Camp sizes (ha)
camps
1–50 51– 101– 251– 501– 751– 1000– 1501– +2000
100 250 500 750 1000 1500 2000
Tweefontein 17 0 0 0 1 6 5 4 0 1
Boesmanplaat 14 0 1 1 8 2 1 1 0 0
Papkuilsfontein 16 1 3 3 5 4 0 0 0 0
De Riet 1 11 0 1 4 3 3 0 0 0 0
De Riet 2 8 0 0 3 4 1 0 0 0 0
66 1 5 11 21 16 6 5 0 1
(100%) (1.5%)  (7.6%) (16.7%)  (31.2%)  (24.2%)  (9.1%) (7.6%) (0%) (1.5%)
Source: Department of Agriculture, 1972, 1989, 1997, 2001, undated
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land is at a premium, selling prices are well
beyond what the DLA is willing to pay.
According to the convenor of the Paulshoek
Commonage Committee, three farms had been
identified for acquisition in the area south of
Paulshoek, but in all three cases the asking
prices proved beyond the reach of DLA and,
as a result, the farms were not acquired.
Thirdly, the availability of farms in the
Kliprand/Bushmanland region could relate to
the fact that climatically the area is not
desirable for farming. Most white commercial
farmers in the Kamiesberg region have
numerous farms spread across Bushmanland,
the Kamiesberg and the western Sandveld.
The farms in the Bushmanland area are only
used sporadically, when rains are good enough
to ensure adequate grazing. The development
officer of the municipality believes that this is
why the Bushmanland farms are more readily
available. The municipal official mentioned
the case of Boesmanplaats, which was
inherited by the previous owner. This person
(who has other farms in the region) had no
real interest in the farm and as a result it stood
empty for many years before being acquired
by the municipality.
A final and more ominous factor that may
be influencing the location of the five newly
acquired farms, and a factor which
stakeholders have been circumspect in
discussing, is the presence of the Vaalputs
Nuclear Waste Disposal Facility. This facility
is adjacent to, or in close proximity to, some
of the new farms (Map 2). Concerns
regarding the potential health and
environmental impact of the facility have been
raised among the community, but no direct
links are made between the availability and
acquisition of the farms and the presence of
Vaalputs. It seems more than coincidence,
however, that Boesmanplaat borders Vaalputs
in the west, and the recently acquired
Kamiebees in the north. The farm Bok Puts,
which is rumoured to be for sale, borders
Vaalputs in the south. Thus, all of the
properties adjacent to Vaalputs are currently
being disposed of.
Infrastructure on the new farms
Given that no infrastructure assessment
reports were prepared when the new farms
were acquired, despite being required by
national commonage policy, the condition of
farm infrastructure such as water and fencing
at the time of acquisition is unknown.
However, according to a member of the
Commonage Committee in Nourivier, at the
time of purchase the infrastructure on many of
the farms was already in need of repair. It is
further alleged that the farms stood unutilised
after acquisition, during which time the
situation deteriorated further, with pumps
being vandalised and fences disappearing.
Whatever the situation may have been,
infrastructure on the new farms is now in
varying states of disrepair. In the case of the
farm Papkuilsfontein, according to one of the
farmers leasing land on the farm, there is one
borehole with a pump, but no pump-head,
with a further two pumps that leak. The
reservoir, fed by these two pumps, is broken
and holds no water. According to a farmer
from Kamasies, who uses land on
Tweefontein, a similar situation prevails there,
while the situation on the De Riet farms is the
same. The state of infrastructure on the new
farms, although improved by 2004, remains a
major point of contention between the
municipality and farmers using camps on
these farms.
Endnotes
10 The farm Dikmatjie, which lies to the north of
Boesmanplaat, was purchased specifically for use
by stock farmers from Kamieskroon. This property
was transferred in December 2003. A number of
other properties in the area are allegedly on the
market, including the farms Kamiebees, Bok Puts,
and two further portions of De Riet (Kwaskraal
and Gannahoek).
11 There are discrepancies between data from the
Deeds Office and data from the farm maps used by
the Department of Agriculture. The Department of
Agriculture maps are used in the management of
the farms and are thus also included here.
12 There is some dispute as to whether or not camp 11
of Tweefontein is part of the new farms, or part of
the old commons. Camp 11 is 946 ha in size. The
camp is currently managed as part of the new
farms and is thus included here.
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13 It is important to note that these are alleged
factors, raised by the municipality and reserve
farmers in response to being asked why all of the
newly acquired farms are clustered on the eastern
side of the reserve. This study undertook no
empirical research to verify or disprove these
claims.
14 This point is strongly contested by certain civil
society stakeholders.
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With the acquisition of the firstfarms for Leliefontein (and in linewith municipal commonage
policy), a community-based Commonage
Committee was formally established in 1999
to co-manage these new farms with the
Kamiesberg municipality. Furthermore, a
Commonage Management Plan for
Leliefontein was developed that incorporates
both the old commons and the new farms (the
Leliefontein Bestuurplan vir die Meent
Gronde of 2000). The Commonage
Management Plan was developed as part of
the 1997–1999 Namaqualand District
Planning Project (SPP, 2003).
The process of developing the Commonage
Management Plan continued in parallel with
the Transformation of Certain Rural Areas
Act (TRANCRAA) implementation process,
which is still ongoing. A part of the
TRANCRAA process has been the
formulation of Municipal Grazing
Regulations.15 According to the SPP
Transformation Report of 2003, communities
were centrally involved in this process, with
workshops being held to discuss new rules
and regulations. The co-management
approach that has been adopted is intended to
ensure that management of the commons
moves away from past top-down practices of
control, rule-making and enforcement, and
towards participative rule-making, with
commonage users being centrally involved in
management (Pienaar & May, 2003). In line
with broader local government transformation
in South Africa, the new management system
has prioritised cost recovery, with resource
users being responsible for the cost of
managing and maintaining the commons
(Pienaar & May, 2003; SPP, 2003). The
commons will be linked into a five-year
budget-linked management plan that is part of
the municipality’s Integrated Development
Plan (IDP).
In late 2003, the Commonage Committee
was converted into a municipal entity in terms
of section 82(2)(a) of the Municipal Systems
Act of 2000. In terms of a Service Delivery
Agreement between the Leliefontein
Commonage Committee and the Kamiesberg
Municipality, the Commonage Committee will
now formally manage both the old commons
and the new farms on behalf of the
municipality, in accordance with the
Management Plan and the Grazing
Regulations.
Although the Commonage Plan of 2000
and the Grazing Regulations of 2002
explicitly address both the new farms and the
reserve commons, and incorporate these
within a single management framework, the
Plan and the Regulations are currently being
implemented only on the new farms.
Implementation on the old commons has been
delayed until the question of ownership is
resolved through the TRANCRAA process.
The acquisition of the new farms has,
however, provided the Municipality, the
Commonage Committee and NGO
stakeholders with an opportunity to implement
and test a new management framework for the
Leliefontein commons. The thinking among
3. Management framework for
the new farms
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stakeholders directly involved in this process
is that this new system will be extended to the
old commons once the TRANCRAA process
has run its course. The assumption is of
course that ownership of the old commons of
Leliefontein will be transferred to the
Municipality and not to some other entity.
However, as will be discussed below, although
the TRANCRAA process is still unresolved,
there is growing pressure from some
stakeholders to have the new management
framework extended to the old commons as
soon as possible.
The co-management framework and land
use model adopted for the new farms, as
encapsulated in the Management Plan,
Grazing Regulations, and the municipal
Service Delivery Agreement, are discussed in
more detail below.
The co-management institution
The two key institutions within the co-
management framework are the Kamiesberg
Municipality and the Leliefontein Commonage
Committee. In the Commonage Management
Plan of 2000, proposed farm committees
would represent all the farmers using land on
the various farms.16 According to farmers on
the new farms, however, these farm
committees have not yet been established,
although since late 2003 ‘farm convenors’
have been appointed for both Tweefontein and
Boesmanplaat. By May 2004, it was still
unclear what the exact role of these farm
convenors would be.
The Commonage Committee is defined in
the Municipal Grazing Regulations as a
commonage management structure consisting
of representatives from the Municipality,
democratically-elected community
representatives and representatives from
relevant agencies, such as the Department of
Agriculture. The task of this Committee is to
manage both the new farms and the reserve
commons on behalf of the municipality in
accordance with the approved Management
Plan and Grazing Regulations (Kamiesberg
Municipality, 2000; Kamiesberg Municipality,
2002; Service Delivery Agreement, 2004).
The Leliefontein Commonage Committee
comprises representatives from commonage
sub-committees established in the different
settlements of Leliefontein. Generally, the
convenor of the village committee and one
additional representative participate in the
Leliefontein Commonage Committee. The
Service Delivery Agreement between the
Municipality and the Commonage Committee
Diagram 1: Composition of the Leliefontein Commonage Committee
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requires that these sub-committees be
established in all of Leliefontein’s ten
settlements. By May 2004, committees had
been established in Paulshoek, Leliefontein,
Nourivier, Kamassies, Rooifontein,
Klipfontein, Spoegrivier and Kharkams.
Commonage Committees had still to be set up
in Kheiss and Tweerivier.
In addition to representatives from the
village committees, the Leliefontein
Commonage Committee also includes a
representative from the Department of
Agriculture in Springbok. The municipal
development officer, who among other duties
is responsible for the old commons and the
new farms, convenes the Committee.17 There
is at present no dedicated commonage
manager in the Municipality, and given this
official’s other duties, he is on occasion
unable to attend Committee meetings. In these
situations, one of the other Committee
members acts as chair (for example, the
Klipfontein representative chaired the meeting
of 25 November 2003).18
The Commonage Committee is dominated
by men, both in numbers and in the
proceedings of meetings. For example, ten
men and five women attended the Committee
meeting held on 6 May 2004. Of these five
women, however, only two participated in
discussions to any degree. A similar situation
prevailed during the Commonage Committee
meetings of 22 July and 14 November 2003.
Both the municipal and agriculture officials
are men, and seven of the eight village
committee convenors are men. This gender
bias in the composition of the Committee is
not surprising given the small number of
women that are stock farmers in their own
right.
There is also an age bias in the
Commonage Committee. On the whole,
members of the committee are of late middle
age or elderly. At least five members of the
Committee are over the age of sixty. The age
composition of the Committee parallels the
age structure of farmers on the Leliefontein
commons generally, as well as those using the
new farms. Of a sample of 21 of the farmers
on the new farms, 52 per cent are over the age
of sixty (in fact three are over the age of
seventy).19 Only one farmer from this sample
of 21 is under the age of forty.
All of the members of the Commonage
Committee are livestock farmers. Moreover,
six of the eight convenors of village
committees have been allocated land on the
new farms (i.e. the convenors from
Kamassies, Nourivier, Rooifontein,
Paulshoek, Leliefontein and Kharkams).
These six individuals have access to a total of
14 of the 66 camps on the new farms,
although a number of these camps are shared
with other farmers. Stock holdings for
Commonage Committee members vary
widely, from 25 head of small stock through
to the equivalent of almost 270 small stock
units. The average stock holding for these six
individuals is 100 small stock units each. The
two committee members that have not gained
access to the new farms are from the
settlements of Spoegrivier and Klipfontein,
both of which are west of the N7 national
road. At least one of these individuals is a
relatively large farmer – in 2002 this
individual farmed with almost 200 small stock
on the Spoegrivier common. The two
individuals are leading a growing lobby within
the Commonage Committee to extend the
‘order of the new farms’ onto the old
commons.
In addition to being stock farmers, a
number of the village convenors are also
entrepreneurs owning shops or running other
enterprises in their local settlements. Many of
these individuals are also prominent in other
spheres. For example, a number of the
convenors were centrally involved in the
Transformation Committees established as
part of the TRANCRAA process relating to
the old commons20, and the member from
Spoegrivier is a municipal councillor. The
convenors of the village committees are,
therefore, prominent individuals within their
communities, and in some cases in broader
local affairs as well.
Within the reserve Commonage Committee
there is a Management Committee (the
dagkomitee). This dagkomitee, which is made
up of the convenors of the respective village
Committees, makes recommendations to the
Commonage Committee on specified issues.
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One of these issues is the short-listing of
applications from farmers for access to the
new farms.
 The performance of the Commonage
Committee will be discussed in section 4,
when the actual use and management
practices on the new farms are discussed.
Land use model and
management
As with past interventions in the reserve, the
approach that has been adopted for the use
and management of the new farms is
characterised by enclosure and individualised
use. In this case, the new farms are divided
into discrete units which are effectively leased
out to individual users. These units
correspond to the existing camps on the new
farms. Stock numbers are to be controlled
through the enforcement of stocking rates that
are based on a prescribed carrying capacity,
currently set at ten hectares per small stock
unit.
The amount of land that a farmer can
access is dependent on the number of stock he
or she owns. Stock numbers also determines
the cost of accessing the land.  Farmers need
to pay what is termed a maintenance fee per
head of stock grazed on the new farms21.
Farmers are, however, only allocated as much
land as they need, in terms of the prescribed
carrying capacity, and up to certain limits. As
a result, smaller farmers will usually share a
camp with others, since the camps would be
too large for a single small farmer’s herd. The
Municipal Development Officer mentioned a
case where there were two small farmers, each
in a separate camp (with the carrying capacity
of these camps being far greater than the size
of the herds). The municipality then moved
the two together into one camp where both
their herds were accommodated by the camp’s
Box 3: Communal farming in Leliefontein
Farming in Leliefontein is focussed on small stock farming (sheep and goats) with some
cultivation of arable allotments when conditions are suitable. Crops are grown for household
consumption and/or as supplementary feed for livestock. The way in which communal and
commercial farmers in Namaqualand operate is different. This relates both to their
production objectives and the approaches and methods employed.
Approach
Communal farmers employ a stock post system on the village commons. Stock posts act as
territorial markers defining spaces on the commons used by different farmers. The commons
are not fenced off into camps where stock are free-ranging. Instead, the herds are taken out
from the stock post each morning, and in many cases, actively herded through the day.
Livestock are corralled in the stock post at night. The areas around stock posts are not the
exclusive domain of the stock post ‘owners’. Other farmers are able to bring their animals in
to graze, although in many instances the rights of stock post ‘owners’ are long-standing and
recognised, and access is negotiated. The movement of herds on the commons is thus largely
opportunistic (although in times of crisis such as drought many herders spend a great deal of
energy deliberately moving with their herds in search of forage).
Objectives
Communal farmers have multiple production objectives. Animal products such as meat and
milk are important contributors to household food security. Livestock represent a means of
capital storage that can easily be accessed. Optimal production strategies thus seek to
maximise herd size at high stocking densities and follow dynamic and opportunistic patterns
of herd size fluctuation depending on climatic variation. Most farmers in Leliefontein are not
wholly dependent on livestock for their livelihoods – there is not enough land for farmers to
sustain themselves on agriculture alone.
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set capacity. The camp that had been vacated
was re-allocated to a larger farmer, whose
animals ‘fitted’ into that camp. Farmers can
therefore only lease as much land as they need
for their animals as determined by the set
carrying capacity. A farmer cannot rent land
surplus to the number of animals he or she
possesses.22 This has implications when
dealing with natural increases in herd sizes
over time, as discussed below.
The Leliefontein Commonage Management
Plan of 200023 and associated Municipal
Grazing Regulations govern the use of the
land that farmers lease. The practices and
approach promoted in the Plan and in the
Grazing Regulations are different to those on
the old commons (see Box 3). The camp
system and the allocation of farmers to camps
is a requirement of the Grazing Regulations.
The camp system has been adopted in order to
facilitate a process of rotational grazing and
the closing of camps for resting to ensure the
maintenance of these grazing lands. In
addition to the stipulations around carrying
capacity and resting and rotation, the
Management Pan and Grazing Regulations
outline a range of other restrictions. For
example, individual farmers are not allowed
more than 200 small stock units each, no
donkeys are allowed on the new farms and
farmers are also not allowed to construct
stock posts in their camps. According to the
Management Plan, the Municipal Council and
the Commonage Committee are responsible
for ensuring that these rules and regulations
are adhered to. Even with the conversion of
the Commonage Committee to a municipal
entity, the legal authority to enforce
regulations will remain with the municipality.
By May 2004, resting and rotation of the
new farms was not being practiced. Given that
all of the camps on the new farms are
allocated, it is going to be difficult to adopt
this practice. In order to rest camps, certain
farmers will need to be moved, which will
prove a difficult task, especially with farmers
who have been in particular camps for a
number of years. If resting and rotation is
indeed not possible, this would represent a
fundamental breach of the new land use
regime.
In terms of stock numbers, the Municipal
Grazing Regulations state that the
Management Plan must outline the steps that
need to be taken, and the factors that need to
be considered for determining carrying
capacity on the new farms. The Management
Plan must also outline what steps will be
taken for reducing stock numbers on the
reserve commons (when the Plan and
Regulations are implemented on the reserve
commons). The official carrying capacity for
the new farms changed slightly over the
course of 2003. In February, the rate was set
at 12 ha per small stock unit, although this
had changed to 10 ha per small stock unit by
November of the same year. The Management
Plan stresses that the official carrying
capacity set for the new farms will not be
exceeded.
Current recommended stocking levels in
Namaqualand are based on a survey
undertaken in the late 1980s by the
Department of Agriculture (DoA) to identify
carrying capacities for various veld types in
the area. It resulted in a map of Namaqualand
being developed, which is divided into
different units with corresponding carrying
capacities. Average carrying capacity for
Namaqualand was set at approximately 10 ha
per small stock unit. The map produced from
this survey is today used by the DoA as a
general guide to what the Namaqualand veld
can tolerate in terms of grazing pressure
(Benjaminsen et al., 2004).
Endnotes
15 ‘Kamiesberg Munisipaliteit Weidingsregulasies’,
Notice 18, Northern Cape Provincial Gazette no.
678 of 2002.
16 All the farmers with rights to graze stock on one
farm were to come together to elect a ‘farm
committee’, which would have supervisory
responsibility for that particular farm (Kamiesberg,
2000).
17 The municipal development officer falls under the
municipality’s Works Department.
18 The municipal development officer has noted that
there is an urgent need for a commonage manager
in the municipality – i.e. someone who is solely
responsible for the old and new Leliefontein
commons. The current development officer’s
mandate covers a range of areas, including
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management of the commons. The lack of
dedicated capacity makes it difficult for
commonage issues to receive the priority attention
they need.
19 In 2004, there are a total of 42 farmers using the
new farms. Data on the ages of these farmers is
only available for 21 of these.
20 These Transformation Committees were disbanded
shortly after the referendum in 2002.
21 In 2000, the maintenance fee (or fee per head of
stock) was set at R0.50 per small stock unit and
R3.00 for large stock units. By the end of 2003, the
figure had been revised and stood at R1.50 per
small stock unit.
22 It should be noted that by May 2004 the
Commonage Committee was trying to allocate
farmers surplus land to cater for herd growth.
23 There is currently a process underway to draft a
new commonage management plan for
Leliefontein. The Commonage Committee has as
yet not been involved in the drafting of this new
plan. In July of 2003, although there was a draft of
this new plan with the municipality, the
commonage committee had not yet seen the
document. In November of 2003, the situation
remained unchanged.
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Which farmers have gained
access to the new farms?
Obtaining reliable data on the farmers that
have accessed the new farms in 2004 has
proven difficult. The municipality does not
have a system for storing such data
(computerised or otherwise), and there is no
single centralised grazing register for the new
farms. As a result, all of the applications by
farmers, short-listing by the dagkomitee of the
Commonage Committee, and the final
selection by the Council is kept on pieces of
paper, many of which are hand written and
stored manually in different places with
different people.
The data on the farmers using the new
farms for 2004 derives from three different
sources. Firstly, the municipality has signed
grazing contracts with 23 of the 42 farmers
using the new farms (by May 2004 the
remaining 19 contracts still needed to be
signed and returned). This information has
been complemented by Commonage
Committee minutes from 25 November 2003
and 17 February 2004, which provide a list of
the farmers and their camp allocations.
Finally, one member of the Commonage
Committee has her own, heavily amended,
hand written list of the 42 farmers using the
farms in 2004. This list also provides
information on their camp allocations, as well
as the stock they are allowed to keep on this
land. All of the data on the farmers using the
new farms (consolidated from the three
sources above) is tabulated in Annex 1.
The first three farms that wereacquired in 1998 – the two portions ofDe Riet and Papkuilsfontein - stood
empty for two years after their acquisition. In
1999, a limited number of farmers moved
onto Papkuilsfontein (although there is no
exact data on how many, or who these farmers
were). A dipping survey carried out in 2002
documented 11 farmers on Boesmanplaat,
Papkuilsfontein and Tweefontein (Department
of Agriculture, 2002). It is uncertain whether
this survey captured all farmers on the new
farms, however.
The municipal development officer and an
advisor from the Department of Agriculture
first visited the De Riet farms in February
2003. At that stage the two De Riet properties
were officially unallocated (although a farmer
from neighbouring Papkuilsfontein was
illegally grazing animals on parts of De Riet).
According to the municipal development
officer, the De Riet farms and most of the
camps on Tweefontein, Boesmanplaat and
Papkuilsfontein stood empty due to problems
with fencing and water. This situation did
change over the course of 2003, however. In
2004, the new farms had been fully allocated
for the first time and access by additional
farmers was closed for the year. In 2004, 42
reserve farmers gained access to the new
farms and were grazing the equivalent of 4274
small stock units on this land.
4. Land use practices on the new
farms
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What is evident from this information is
that the location of the new farms has indeed
proved a strong influence on who the farmers
are that are able to use them. At least 88 per
cent of these farmers come from settlements
east of the N7 freeway, with 68 per cent of
this 88 per cent residing in the three
settlements closest to the new farms (namely
Kamassies, Rooifontein and Nourivier).
According to the available data, only 6 per
cent come from settlements on the western
side (from Kharkams in particular), with a
further 6 per cent registered as currently
residing outside of the reserve as migrant
workers (at Okiep and Carolusberg).24 Which
settlements in the reserve these stockowners
come from is unknown, although it is
probable that at least one resides on the
eastern side of Leliefontein, since this
individual has been using camps on
Tweefontein since 2002.
Table 4 provides a breakdown of the
distribution of herd sizes on the new farms for
2004. What is apparent is that almost 75 per
cent of farmers (that is 30 of 42 farmers) have
herds comprising more than 50 small stock
units. Six of these 30 farmers (or 15 per cent
of all farmers) have herds in excess of 200
small stock units.25
In looking at the 27 per cent of farmers
with herds of less than 50 small stock units, it
is important to note that although these may
be seen as small farmers, many are also
entrepreneurs (for example, the convenor of
the Paulshoek Commonage Committee, who
only has 37 head of stock, but is also a
shopkeeper in Paulshoek). A number of these
farmers have only recently purchased these
animals, using credit from the Land Bank.26
When comparing the distribution of herd
sizes on the new farms to stock distribution on
the old commons, it is clear that the small
farmer grouping (i.e. those with herds of
under 50 animals) is under-represented. On
the old commons this group accounts for 42
per cent of all farmers, yet on the new farms,
Box 4: Communal farmers in Leliefontein
According to a 1997 SPP survey, there were approximately 460 farming households in
Leliefontein. These farming households constituted 52 per cent of the total households in the
reserve. At the time, there were approximately 30 000 small stock units in the reserve.
Stock ownership is not equally distributed among these households and reserve farmers can
be categorised according to their stock holdings.
In examining survey data of farmers in Leliefontein, the following distribution of stock
ownership can be identified:
• Small farmers: Forty two per cent of herds are of less than 50 animals. These herds,
however, only constitute 10 per cent of all stock in the eastern half of Leliefontein (DoA,
2002). This in line with the broader trend for household stock ownership in the
Namaqualand reserves, where 44 per cent of households own less than 45 animals (SPP,
2003).
• Middle farmers: Forty seven per cent of all herds are between 51 and 200 animals. These
herds comprise 52 per cent of all stock in eastern Leliefontein (DoA, 2002). Again, this is
in line with the broader trend for the communal areas of Namaqualand, where approxi-
mately 42 per cent of households own between 46 and 225 animals (SPP, 1997).
• Large farmers: Eleven per cent of herds consist of 201 animals and more. These herds
account for 38 per cent of all stock in eastern Leliefontein. Four per cent account for almost
20 per cent of all stock. This 4 per cent of herds all consist of 300 animals or more (DoA,
2002). This is also in line with broader trends for household ownership in Namaqualand
(SPP, 1997).
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only 27 per cent fall within this category. It is
the middle and larger farmers (that is 50 to
200 animals, and 200 animals or more) that
are the primary beneficiaries of these newly
acquired commons.
Five of the six largest farmers (i.e. those
with herds of more than 200 small stock units)
have been on the new farms since at least
2002. The herds of these five farmers have
increased substantially in the 2002–2004
period, as shown in Table 5.
Anecdotal evidence from discussions with
farmers indicates that it is not only the largest
farmers that are doing well. On the whole,
farmers on the new farms were able to survive
the drought and winter of 2003 relatively
unscathed compared to the old commons
where all farmers suffered heavy stock losses.
Stock losses on the new farms were reportedly
minimal.
It is evident then that the majority of
farmers gaining access to the new farms are
larger farmers with resources and capacity to
use the land (i.e. with motorised transport and
sufficient income – from farming or other
sources – to farm under the land use system
Table 3: Origin of farmers using the new farms
Residing outside reserve Okiep 1
Carolusberg 1 6% (6%)
Residing west of the N7 Kharkams 2 6% (6%)





Rooifontein 12 32% (88%)
Total 36* 100%
*The available data on farmers using the new farms only provides information on origins for 36 of the 42
farmers.
Table 4:  Distribution of herd size among farmers on the new farms
Herd size Number of farmers Percentage of total
1-50 11 27% (27%)
51-100 14 34%
101-150 9 22%
151-200 1 2% (58%)
201-250 2 5%
251-300 3 7%
301+ 1 3% (15%)
Total 41* 100%
*Stock data is only available for 41of the 42 farmers.
22
Municipal commonage as a form of land redistribution
set up on the new farms). It is also evident
that these farmers are benefiting from the
better quality of forage available on the new
farms, versus that of the old commons and
herd sizes are growing (in some cases
substantially).
Factors influencing access to the
new farms
There are a number of factors that have
influenced which farmers from Leliesfontein
have gained access to the new farms.
Location of the new farms
As indicated by data on the origins of farmers
using the new farms, almost 90 per cent of
farmers come from eastern Leliefontein, and
in particular from the three settlements closest
to this land - Kamassies, Rooifontein and
Nourivier. The close proximity of the farms to
these settlements allows stockowners to walk
their stock to the farms if necessary.
Monitoring of stock and herders is also made
easier by their close proximity of the farms.
For farmers in Paulshoek, on the other
hand, private farmland between the Paulshoek
common and the De Riet farms hampers direct
access, although these properties are the
closest to Paulshoek. The owner of this farm
is denying Paulshoek farmers access across
his land, and as a result farmers from
Paulshoek need to travel into De Riet from the
north via Nourivier. Despite numerous
requests from Paulshoek farmers that the
municipality intervene and negotiate access,
by May 2004 the issue had not yet been
resolved. In practice this means that most
Paulshoek farmers, other than those with
motorised transport, are effectively excluded
from the new farms. If the Kwaskraal and
Gannahoek portions of De Riet are indeed on
the market, acquisition of this land would
effectively join the existing De Riet farms
directly to the Paulshoek common (see Map
2). This would facilitate greater access by
farmers from Paulshoek. These difficulties of
access as a result of the location of the farms
are reflected in the formal process of farmer
selection (although initially this was not the
case).
Access criteria
The process of accessing the new farms should
start with an assessment, by the Commonage
Committee, of what space is available on what
farms and for how many head of stock. Space
on the new farms should then be advertised for
individual farmers to apply.
In practice, the situation is somewhat
different. All farmers interested in gaining
access to the new farms now simply apply in
November of each year. Given that there are
large numbers of applications, and there is
limited space on the farms, certain criteria are
applied. These criteria are set out in the
Management Plan. Applications from farmers
are reviewed by the dagkomitee of the
Commonage Committee, which then submits
recommendations back to the broader reserve
Committee. Once these recommendations are
endorsed, they are submitted to the Works
Committee of the municipality. Finally, the
recommendations are submitted to the
Municipal Council for approval. On final
Table 5: Growth in herd sizes of five of the largest farmers (2002–2004)
Farmer* 200227 (SSU) 2004 (SSU) % Change
Farmer 36 189 211 12%
Farmer 37 158 230 46%
Farmer 39 158 293 85%
Farmer 40 21 300 1329%
Farmer 41 97 496 411%
*The identity of farmers has been kept confidential in this study. The farmer numbers however correspond
to those presented in Annex 1.
23
4. Land use practices on the new farms
approval, farmers are notified in writing as to
the outcome of their applications. These
farmers are then required to fill in and sign a
grazing contract (of which they keep a copy
as proof of their right of access) and submit
these to the municipality.
Criteria considered by the Commonage
Committee include the farmer’s history of
payment of municipal levies (stock fees for
the new farms, as well as residential levies)
and their record of use of the new farms, in
particular adherence to regulations and
staying out the full term of their lease. Thus,
for example, there have been farmers who
were allocated farms in the past, but who then
were constantly moving between the new
farms and the old commons, or who left the
farms altogether before their leases were up.
These farmers were not considered in the
2004 round of allocations.
Initially, in the Management Plan of 2000,
preference was given to individuals with a
household income of less than R1 710 per
month, and there was a stated and practiced
commitment to prioritise smaller, poorer
farmers. This has changed, however, with the
realisation that many of the smaller, poorer
farmers are physically unable to access the
farms unassisted, largely due to a lack of
transport. As a result, the maximum limit of
75 head of stock per farmer set for the new
farms was increased to 200 head per farmer to
allow access to better-resourced farmers. This
new criterion is supported in the Grazing
Regulations which requires that the capacity
of the applicant to farm (die kapasiteit van
die aansoeker om to boer) be considered,
including the quality of the applicant’s stock
and the availability of transport. In an
informal discussion with the municipal
development officer in May 2004, it was
mentioned that the 200 stock limit was not
being strictly enforced. It is for this reason
that some of the farmers on the new farms
legally have more than 200 stock units on
their allocations.
Diagram 2: The application and selection process
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By 2003, the dagkomitee was taking in to
account the practical reality of the location of
the farms. In the processing of applications
for 2004, the number of farmers from
Paulshoek given access to the new farms was
limited to those farmers with motorised
transport. In past years more farmers from
Paulshoek were allocated access, but many
did not use their camps because they could not
get there or they abandoned them because the
infrastructure on the land allocated to them
was not functional. As a result, in 2004 only
two farmers from Paulshoek gained access to
the new farms.
The municipality and the Commonage
Committee justify this shift in focus from the
poor to the more privileged in two ways: first,
by the ability of larger, wealthier farmers to
physically access the new farms using
motorised transport; and secondly, in altruistic
terms, by suggesting that removing larger
farmers from the old commons would benefit
the smaller farmers that remain behind by
reducing stock numbers.
Large stock farmers remaining in the old
commons express this altruistic sentiment as
well. A large stock owner and entrepreneur
from Rooifontein, for example, says that since
there are only a small number of big farmers
around Rooifontein these farmers should go to
the new farms. This would create more space
for the small farmers that remained behind.
The big farmers have transport and are thus
able to access and use the new farms. The
small farmers usually walk to their stock
posts or use donkey carts, and the new farms
are too far for that. The same Rooifontein
farmer also mentioned small farmers from the
community who had access to the new farms
in past years but came back after a period of
time because they could not afford to use
them. The costs associated with employing a
herder, travelling to and from the camps, and
the stock fees, make it a non-viable enterprise
for small farmers. This large farmer said that
he deliberately stays on the outer edge of the
Rooifontein common where it is less
congested since his herd would consume all
the available forage if he were to move closer
to the central region of the common where
there are more farmers.
Many of the small farmers would welcome
the opportunity to gain access to the new
farms if the factors that prohibit their access
could be addressed, particularly the issue of
transport. However, a number of small
Box 5: Removing large farmers from the old commons
‘The problem is that there are just too many farmers, and there is not enough space for
everyone. At the moment the veld is trampled (“uitgetrap”). There are so many animals in
this area that it quickly gets trampled (“dat die veld so gou uitgetrap word”). It would be a
good idea for some farmers at Gorap to go to the new camps. Then there would be less of
us here and the veld won’t get trampled out like it does. That would take stock off the areas
that are trampled and overgrazed and give it time to rest and recover. But the problem is
that we can’t get there (the new farms). If the municipality could provide a truck and
arrange that certain people’s stock go the new camps at certain times, for example …’
(Small farmer, Paulshoek common, 18 November 2003).
This farmer spoke about the largest herd in Paulshoek. He complains that the herd, due to its
size, tramples everything into the ground. ‘If the big farmers moved to the new farms it
would be so much better for those that remain behind. The big herds just trample the veld
and make life difficult for the small farmers in the area’ (18 November 2003).
When asked how many big farmers there are in Paulshoek, the farmer said that there were
none left. Gert ‘Swartbooi’ and ‘Dubbele Jan’ at Windpoort who had around 150 head of
stock, for example could go to the new farms, but they too have suffered heavy losses and
now probably only have around 50 stock left.
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farmers have also identified the camp-based
system and associated stock fees as being ‘too
expensive’ – it would not be cost-effective for
a farmer with 30 animals to rent land on the
new farms. The prohibition on stock posts on
the new farms and associated cost of hiring a
herder are further factors making them
unattractive to owners of small herds. For
these reasons, many small farmers would
welcome a policy of moving larger farmers off
the old commons (see Box 5).
Community dynamics
There is a perception, among those farmers
that have not been able to access the new
farms that access is determined by factors
other than those set out in the Commonage
Plan and the Grazing Regulations. Thus, an
informant in Rooifontein is of the opinion that
whether or not one gets access to the new
farms is strongly influenced by the people
leading the allocation process (i.e. the
Commonage Committee and in particular the
dagkomitee) and those close to these
committee members. It is alleged that in
Rooifontein access has to do with family and
connections – it is family and friends of
committee members that get preference (‘dit is
net hulle wat toegelaat is’ – it is only them
who are allowed access).
Small farmers in Paulshoek and
Leliefontein villages express a similar view
seeing the new farms allocation process as
having been ‘captured’ by local elites (see
Box 6). These individuals are either large
farmers or entrepreneurs, or both.  Some have
permanent formal employment outside
Leliefontein (despite access criteria requiring
farmers to be full-time residents in the area)
although remaining very active within their
communities around political and
developmental issues.28
In discussions with small farmers
remaining on the Paulshoek common and in
discussions among Kameelkrans Farmers
Union members, these elites are disparagingly
referred to as ‘die mense wat voor staan’ –
the people who stand in front. In the view of
many small farmers, these people have
manoeuvred themselves to the forefront of the
new farms process, largely in pursuit of their
own interests, though claiming to speak on
behalf of the broader community. This
sentiment is widely held, with most small
farmers on the old commons feeling excluded
from the new farms (and the ongoing
TRANCRAA process). These ‘people who
stand in front’ are disparagingly likened to the
Box 6: Local elites and the transformation process
‘...die vooraanstandes praat nou vir ons. Maar blykbaar is ons nie een en die selfde nie. Die
mense op die kommitee, wat vir ons moet praat … hulle praat nie soos hulle moet praat nie.
Hy praat in sy guns, hy praat nie in onse guns, hy praat in sy eie guns. Die ding is, ons is
oningelig. Nou die mense wat ingelig is weet van wat hulle praat. Hy praat nie reg vir ons,
hy praat net vir homself reg. Hy praat nie as of dit jou raak nie, as of dit jou nie raak nie.
Dinge was baaie anders in die verlede. As iemand gegaan het, het hy gegaan om vir hierdie
heele plek te praat. Maar nou is it nie meer so nie.’
(those in front now speak for us. But it seems that we are not one and the same. Those
people on the committee, that should be speaking for us, … they don’t talk the way they
should be talking. He talks in his own favour, he does not talk in our favour. He speaks for
his own interests. The thing is we (small farmers) are not informed. These people are
informed and know what they are talking about. But they don’t speak correctly for us, they
just speak for themselves. He speaks as if it does not affect me, as if it does not affect you.
Things were very different in the past. If someone spoke, he spoke for the whole place. But
now it is not like that anymore.)
Small farmer, Paulshoek common (July 2003)
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kind of people who pushed the economic units
agenda in the 1980s (and indeed for some of
them this is true).
This fault-line in the community, which
can be interpreted as one of class distinction,
is often described in terms of differing values.
At the Kameelkrans Farmers Union meeting,
an elderly participant noted that those leading
the current transformation process are more
educated and openly ambitious. It is alleged
that these individuals look down on the older
and often smaller farmers, who are reluctant
to change their farming practices and embrace
a more commercial orientation. A common
lament, expressed by almost all of the older
and smaller farmers on the Paulshoek
common, is the breakdown of respect between
people in the community and the erosion of
the traditional communal ethos that once
prevailed in Leliefontein, as people
increasingly only look after themselves.
Actual use practices on the new farms
As noted above, all stock farmers whose
applications are successful are required to
sign a grazing contract with the council before
being allowed access to the new farms. This
contract commits these farmers to the land use
regulations prescribed for the new farms. For
2004, this requirement was not being enforced
very effectively. By May of 2004, only 23 of
42 grazing contracts had been returned to the
municipality.
According to the regulations, the signing of
this grazing contract serves to invalidate any
previous arrangement of access to the (old and
new) commons of Leliefontein. From the point
of signing this agreement, the commons can
only be used in terms of the regulations. In
other words, even if a farmer is listed on an
existing grazing register, or has a letter of
acknowledgement (toekennings brief) in terms
of Act 9 of 1987 as a valid user of the
common, this does not mean that the person
any longer has rights to use the commons. The
commons can thus only be used in terms of
the current regulations and grazing contract.
At present, this provision is only applicable to
the new farms. However, if implemented on
the old commons, this provision may mean
that many farmers there would effectively lose
their historical rights of access, since many
are not registered with the municipality and
have not signed these grazing agreements.
Farmers on the old commons are generally
reluctant to register as farmers with the
municipality, since it would mean revealing
their stock numbers and having to pay grazing
fees for these animals (something which many
poor farmers cannot afford).
Despite the signing of grazing contracts by
farmers, and by implication their commitment
to adherence to the rules and regulations
governing land use, there is open flouting of
these on a number of fronts. As already noted,
at a broader level, the management framework
for the new farms has already been
fundamentally undermined by the allocation of
all the camps, effectively preventing resting
and rotation. Compounding this is the fact
that the new farms are already overstocked in
relation to the stocking capacities set in the
grazing regulations (as will be discussed
below). Although all farmers have to re-apply
to renew their allocation at the end of each
year, and the opportunity would then exist to
remove farmers from the farm, it is unlikely
this will happen. To date, the leases of farmers
already on the new farms have generally been
renewed (unless farmers voluntarily
withdraw).
The Flouting of regulations
(i) Stocking rates on the new farms
Despite carrying capacity being the central
management tool of the new farms’
management framework, field research for
this study indicates that four of the five new
farms are overstocked (in relation to the set
carrying capacity of 10 ha/SSU).
As indicated in Table 6, three of the new
farms are quite heavily overstocked with
stocking rates of 6.0, 6.8 and 7.6 ha per small
stock unit respectively for De Riet 2,
Papkuilsfontein and Tweefontein. Only De
Riet 1 is within set stocking rates at 10.3 ha/
SSU, with Boesmanplaat a little over at 9.4 ha
per small stock unit.
By May 2004, stock limits set for the new
farms, as stipulated in the Municipal Grazing
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Table 6: Stocking rates on the new farms (May 2004)
Farm Farm Recommended Actual Actual Percentage
size stock stock stocking over-
(ha) numbers numbers rate stocked
De Riet 2 2379 238 394 6.0 66
Papkuilsfontein 5060 506 747 6.8 48
Tweefontein 15717 1572 2057 7.6 24
Boesmanplaat 6956 696 740 9.4 6
De Riet 1 3443 344 334 10.3 0
Regulations, had therefore been exceeded by
over 20 per cent.
This overstocking is the result of natural
herd growth on the new farms, the failure by
farmers to sell stock, and the absence of any
form of enforcement by the co-management
institution. In 2002 and 2003, for example,
when herds outgrew their initial allocations,
there was still space for the Commonage
Committee to allocate more land to these
farmers. Now that the new farms are being
fully utilised (and there are still a large
number of farmers applying for access) this is
no longer possible, and in all likelihood stock
numbers will continue to grow in the absence
of effective enforcement. Attempts are being
made to deal with the issue, although it remains
to be seen how effective these will be.
In May 2004, the Commonage Committee
decided that when camps on the new farms do
open up (there are examples of farmers
withdrawing their stock and moving back to
the old commons due to problems with water
or fencing in the camp, or problems with
transport), such land would be reallocated to
farmers already on the new farms. In the
absence of any effective means of compelling
these farmers to reduce their stock numbers,
such reallocation would be aimed at reducing
the stocking rates of farmers whose stock
numbers are too high. New entrants will only
be considered during the annual November
application process.
(ii) Removing all stock to the new farms
In terms of the regulations, farmers on the
new farms are required to take all of their
stock to the new farms and are not allowed to
bring these animals back to the old commons
or keep additional animals on the old
commons during the period of their lease.
Despite this requirement, however, there
are a number of farmers still keeping stock on
the old commons. A farmer from Nourivier,
who leases land on Papkuilsfontein, for
example, had 143 goats on the old commons
in 2003. This farmer would have needed three
more camps on the new commons to
accommodate all of his stock there. There are
also farmers who move their stock back onto
the old commons. The problem with farmers
moving back from the new farms is that other
farmers have often started using the land they
previously used on the old commons. Farmers
that moved back onto the old commons from
the new farms over 2002 and 2003 did so
because of problems with fencing and water
infrastructure in the camps allocated to them.
(iii) Restricting stock to allocated camps
A further breach of regulations is that farmers
on the new camps do not restrict their stock to
their allocated camps and graze animals in
surrounding camps. According to the
convenor of the Paulshoek Commonage
Committee (and confirmed during a number of
Commonage Committee meetings), during
2002 and 2003, one of the farmers allocated a
camp on Papkuilsfontein rarely kept his
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animals there. Instead, the animals were
grazed on neighbouring land on De Riet that,
until November 2003, had not yet been
allocated. When the Commonage Committee
inspected the farm, the farmer would make
sure his stock was in his allocated camp.
However, when people come out to the new
farms unannounced, they would find his stock
elsewhere. In May 2004, the farmer applied
formally for the camp on De Riet that he
allegedly has been ‘poach grazing’, and which
is currently unutilised due to problems with
water.29
A further regulation that is being flouted is
that a number of farmers are keeping more
than six donkeys on the new farms. Four of
these farmers have seven donkeys, while one
has ten.
Box 7: Large farmer and entrepreneur (Rooifontein)
According to a farmer from Rooifontein, some farmers bring their stock back onto the old
commons when they have used up the forage on their allocated land on the new farms. When
these farmers leave the new farms they simply give notice and stop paying, regardless of
whether their lease contracts have expired or not. The Commonage Committee does nothing
about this, since these farmers have been chosen for the new farms. The farmers that have
not gained access have stayed on the old commons, but those that have access simply do as
they please.
Large farmer and entrepreneur in Rooifontein (November 2003)
Table 7: Disjuncture between rules and regulations and actual practice on the new farms of Leliefontein
Commonage Management Plan / Municipal De facto practice on the new farms
Grazing Regulations
Rotational grazing and regular resting of camps. All camps are allocated with no camps currently resting
and none open for rotation.
Stocking rates for the new farms, set in the Municipal Four of the five farms are overstocked to varying degrees
Grazing Regulations, are not to be exceeded. (3 severely so in relation to set carrying capacity).
Farmers on the new farms are allowed a maximum of Six farmers or 15 per cent of farmers on the new farms
200 SSUs each. have in excess of 200 SSUs.
Farmers are to keep their stock within their allocated There are limited but reported cases of farmers grazing
camps. on camps not yet allocated or occupied by others.
Farmers must move all their stock to the new farms. A number of farmers keep additional animals on the
old commons, and some farmers move between
allocated camps on the new farms and the old commons.
Farmers are allowed to keep a maximum of six donkeys Seven farmers have donkeys on the new farms. Five of
as draught animals. The council will remove all donkeys these have more than six donkeys each.
that are not branded and registered from the commons
and new farms.
Applications for access to the new farms will only be At least three farmers allocated camps on the new farms
considered from farmers that are full-time residents in are permanently employed and resident outside of the
Leliefontein. reserve. These three farmers have 53, 78 and 293
SSUs respectively.
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De facto privatisation of the new
commons
Growing ‘privatisation’ poses a threat to the
new farms remaining a communal resource
potentially open to all residents of
Leliefontein. Privatisation, or exclusion, is
relevant at two levels. Firstly, at the level of
individual farmers and their camps; and
secondly, for the new farms as a block of land
being separated off from the former reserve
commons for the exclusive use by a particular
group of farmers.
At an individual level, there is a growing
sense of ownership of camps among a number
of farmers currently using the new farms.
According to a member of the Nourivier
Commonage Committee, this attitude is
particularly prevalent among those farmers
who have been on the new farms the longest.
A number of these individuals had in the
1980s successfully applied for camps under
the economic unit policy (before this scheme
was terminated), and display a sense of
entitlement to the camps they have now
secured on the new farms through the
Municipal Commonage Programme.
According to this member, these individuals
openly question the authority of the
Commonage Committee in relation to how
they use their camps, and challenge any
suggestion that at some point in the future
their camps may be leased out to other
farmers. When confronted by the Commonage
Committee on this issue, they produce letters
from the former management board indicating
their exclusive right to camps under the
former economic unit policy. ‘Dis daaie man
se heiligdom daaie’ – it (the letter from the
management board) is that man’s holy
artefact.
 These farmers argue that the denial of
private access to the old commons (as
proposed under the old economic unit policy)
entitles them to private access now under the
new municipal leasehold scheme on the new
farms. In speaking with one of these farmers,
their individual control of land is justified by
linking the problem of degradation on the old
commons directly to communal farming
practices and communal tenure. For this
farmer (who was also a beneficiary under the
economic unit policy), the new farms
represent a new opportunity to secure control
of a private piece of land where he can farm
without interference from or conflict with
other communal land users.
What is becoming evident at a broader
level is that the individual farmers who have
managed to get allocations on the new farms
in the 2000 to 2004 period are increasingly
consolidating their positions there. Other than
farmers voluntarily terminating their leases, or
severely breaching regulations, under the
current management plan there is no reason
to remove them. Current practice is to renew
the leases of those farmers already on the new
farms. As a result of this, the new farms are
gradually being excised from the broader
Leliefontein commons, and being effectively
set aside for the exclusive benefit of the small
group of farmers from Leliefontein that have
managed to gain access over the past few
years. In this sense, the new farms are in
danger of ceasing to be municipal commonage
potentially open to all of Leliefonteins’
farmers, and instead becoming the private
domain of a small, well-resourced group of
larger farmers.
The co-management institution
From the preceding discussion, it is evident
that the new farms have come to benefit one
particular group of farmers. In addition, it is
apparent that there is a growing disjuncture
between the management framework put in
place for the new farms and the actual
practices on the land. None of these
developments have taken place surreptitiously.
The shift in beneficiary focus was decided by
the Commonage Committee, while the
growing disjuncture between the management
framework and actual practice is taking place
openly, having featured on the agenda of every
Commonage Committee meeting in 2003 and
the first half of 2004.
Why, if the stated motivation for the new
farms framework is to ensure sustainable use
of the new commons (i.e. the conservation of
grazing resources), is there this growing
disjuncture between policy and practice? In
questioning the municipality and the
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Commonage Committee on this, a number of
factors relating to a lack of power and
capacity on the part of the co-management
institution were raised.
Up until the end of 2003 when the Service
Delivery Agreement was signed, the village
Commonage Committees (as well as the
broader Leliefontein Commonage Committee)
had no legal authority and thus no power to
enforce or implement the Management Plan
and Grazing Regulations. These structures
only had advisory powers with final authority
residing with the municipal council. However,
given that the municipality itself is weak, it
was unable to respond timeously and
effectively to issues reported by the local
Commonage Committees. The following
examples serve to illustrate this.
On the Leliefontein village common there
is an individual who managed to secure
individual use rights to a communal ram camp
for a period of five years early in 2003. A
municipal official, as opposed to the Council,
allegedly granted permission to the farmer.
The community is unhappy because this
individual has essentially privatised a
communal resource. Over the course of 2003,
numerous warnings were issued ordering the
farmer to move, but to no avail. The
municipality finally instituted legal action to
have the farmer removed in late 2003. By
May 2004, the issue was still unresolved and
was being dealt with between the attorneys of
the municipality and the farmer. Community
representatives on the Commonage Committee
feel that the municipality has not taken full
responsibility for this situation (although the
problem originates within the municipality),
and feel that not enough was done to resolve
the case. A further example of the weakness
of the municipality that is often cited by
farmers (both those on the new farms and
those on the reserve commons) relates to
infrastructure repair and maintenance. In the
case of the new farms, some of the water
points are broken and require repair. The
water points cannot be fixed, however, since a
moratorium has been placed on expenditure
by the Works Department of the municipality.
Although the municipality acknowledges that
there are people in the villages who have the
skills to fix these pumps, the municipality will
not allow non-municipal staff to work on
municipal infrastructure. This situation
infuriates farmers, especially since they pay
for access to this land.
Whether the Commonage Committee, now
legally constituted as a municipal entity, will
prove any more able at enforcing the Grazing
Regulations, or at maintaining commonage
infrastructure, is doubtful at this point.
A further constraint raised by members of
the Commonage Committee when it comes to
operating effectively is the lack of capacity
and resources to effectively carry out their
duties. This applies to general tasks such as
attending meetings of the reserve Commonage
Committee, but also to specific tasks. For
example, farmers tend to under-represent their
stock numbers when registering with the
municipality. To address this, the local
Commonage Committees should be
undertaking stock counts every two years,
with the first of these due to have started in
June 2003. However, since there are no
resources available to undertake this activity
(for example to cover transport costs), the
counting of herds has not taken place. It was
proposed at a reserve Commonage Committee
meeting in July 2003 that a commonage
inspector be employed to undertake this task,
but such an inspector would have to be paid,
and the municipality does not have the money
for this. A similar situation applies to the
employment of a dedicated commonage
manager within the municipality.
This lack of authority and capacity to
exercise authority is of great concern to
Commonage Committee members as they feel
it undermines their ability to develop a
credible role and relationship with farmers.
Although the conversion to a municipal entity
may address the authority deficit on the part
of the Commonage Committee, it is unclear
whether it will address financial and human
capacity constraints. In many ways, the ability
to address this concern lies beyond the control
of the municipality, since it relates to the
creation of a well-resourced and capacitated
developmental local government in the
broader South Africa. This transformation of
local government is, however, still ongoing,
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and it is probable that the Kamiesberg
Municipality will remain under-resourced for
the foreseeable future. Thus, according to
Committee members at least, the growing
disjuncture between policy and practice
relates primarily to the weakness of the co-
management institution.
Although the lack of capacity and power
on the part of the co-management institution
are real factors affecting the ability of the
Committee to enforce rules and regulations,
there are other dynamics at play as well. What
has become evident in the course of this
research is that despite the problems cited by
Commonage Committee members, the co-
management institution is able to act on
selected issues when it so chooses.
In relation to certain issues, the Committee
decision-making process is effective and runs
relatively smoothly. For example, the annual
application and allocation process takes place
in terms of accepted practice, and is generally
completed in time for the start of each year
(this has been the case for 2003 and 2004 at
least). In addition, throughout the year, the
Commonage Committee actively manages the
camps in terms of re-allocation when camps
become available, and on the whole enforces
exclusive rights to these allocations. The
Leliefontein Commonage Committee meets on
a monthly basis, with most issues relating to
the new farms being discussed, and with
minutes being kept of these meetings.
However, when it comes to certain
fundamental areas of decision-making, in
particular those relating to enforcement of
land use rules and regulations, the
Commonage Committee stumbles. A key
example here is the issue of stocking rate
enforcement. Although this issue is discussed
at all of the Commonage Committee meetings,
the Committee does not act in a way that
requires farmers on the new farms to actually
reduce their stock numbers. The following
example is illustrates this.
At the Commonage Committee in May
2004, one of the farmers already on the new
farms made an urgent application for access
to a neighbouring camp that had recently
become available. This farmer had 30 to 40
lambs that needed to be prepared for
marketing and his original camp allocations
did not have enough forage. This farmer, who
has been on the new farms since at least 2002
and who has a reputation for poach grazing
on neighbouring camps, already had more
animals than he could accommodate on the
land he had been allocated (in May 2004 he
was operating at a stocking rate of 6.1 ha/
SSU, as opposed to the stipulated 10 ha/
SSU). A small minority of Committee
members felt that the application should be
turned down since he had a record of non-
adherence to rules and regulations. It should
be noted that, although rejecting the farmer’s
application, this group did not propose forcing
him to reduce his stock numbers. A larger
lobby within the Committee felt the farmer
should be supported. In fact, this larger group
feels that the Commonage Committee should
wherever possible provide support to farmers
producing for sale (for commercial purposes).
Nor did the group raise any concerns
regarding the farmer’s overstocking.
This skirting around the issue of
enforcement has been ongoing. Since at least
July 2003, the Commonage Committee has
been discussing the need to carry out regular
farm inspections, where infrastructure can be
examined and stock data collected. The
Committee believes that farmers on the new
farms are under-representing their stock
numbers (in the same way farmers on the old
commons are doing). At every Commonage
Committee meeting since then the same issue
has been raised, and the same
recommendation of farm inspections made,
yet by May 2004 no farm inspections had
been carried out.
As discussed earlier, the Commonage
Committee argues that the reason these
inspections have not taken place is because
the Commonage Committee lacks the capacity
and resources to do so. However, other events
show that this is not necessarily the case. In
2003, a number of problems arose between
farmers on the new farm of Tweefontein, with
some accusing others of encroachment into
their camps. In the course of this conflict, one
of the farmers shot at the herder of another
farmer. The Commonage Committee promptly
undertook a farm inspection and investigated
32
Municipal commonage as a form of land redistribution
these complaints. The issue appears to have
been resolved in a short period of time.
It would appear from this incident that the
Committee is able to act, but it seems to
choose the issues it acts on. It may not be in
the interest of the Commonage Committee,
made up largely of farmers (many of whom
are on the new farms), to act on the issue of
stock numbers. It is, however, in their interest
as individual farmers to enforce their
exclusive rights of access to camps on the new
farms. Thus, issues of allocation and
enforcement of exclusive rights to camps get
dealt with timeously and effectively, while
regulations that relate to what can be
extracted from these allocations are ignored.
This behaviour is ironic given that the active
narrative informing the new farms process is
that of a ‘tragedy of the commons’ – i.e.
selfish individuals blindly pursuing their own
personal interests at the cost of the broader
group resource. The co-management
framework and the individualised leasehold
scheme all derive directly from this narrative.
In relation to the commons of Leliefontein,
it appears that this narrative has been
deliberately subverted, however.
Individualisation is being promoted by those
with self-interest in the dismantling of
common property and the establishment of
non-communal forms of tenure on community
land. By May 2004, there was growing
pressure from within the Commonage
Committee to extend the camp-based
leasehold framework of the new farms onto
the old commons (see Box 8). This issue was
Box 8: Management of the old commons
At the May 2004 Commonage Committee meeting the Spoegrivier and Klipfontein
convenors raised a concern that the Commonage Committee was still only operating on the
new farms. Both individuals urged that ‘the order that is on the new farms’ also be
introduced to the old commons. They feel that the Committee has focussed for so long on the
new farms that they no longer know what is happening on the old commons. ‘Although these
lands are communal and people have rights to graze anywhere, there is a need for order
…’ They proposed that the Commonage Committee discuss how to integrate the old
commons and the new farms under the new management framework. Although both are
stock farmers, neither of them is currently accessing the new farms.
The Paulshoek convenor responded, stating that only he and one other farmer from
Paulshoek, who have been allocated camps on the new farms, are paying grazing fees. No
other Paulshoek farmers are paying for their stock or for the maintenance of infrastructure.
He feels all farmers (on the new farms and the old commons) should be paying. The
Spoegrivier representative agreed, adding that farmers on the old commons do what and as
they please. He feels that all users of the commons must be held accountable for their use of
the land, and proposes that all farmers be billed, and that they ‘be forced to pay’. The
Nourivier representative commented that there are ‘unlawful, irresponsible people out there
who say to hell with the municipality and the new framework’.
It was, however, noted that in bringing such order to the reserve commons there is a need for
accurate information and maps of the boundaries of the different village commons. The
Spoegrivier representative responded that maps indicating the village commons and the
different ‘units’ (camps) were developed during the implementation of the economic unit
policy (in the 1980s). He feels that going back to the economic unit boundaries would help in
introducing orderly land use in that it would enable farmers to be allocated to particular
areas on the reserve commons  (as is currently the practice on the new farms with the
allocation of camps) and to hold these farmers accountable for their use of the land.
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strongly argued by those Committee members
who, in practice, are unable to access the new
farms (for example, those from Spoegrivier
and Klipfontein which are on the western side
of the N7 national road). In order to derive
similar benefits to those being enjoyed by
farmers on the new farms, the solution for
these individuals is to introduce a similar
individualised land use framework for the old
commons. This would effectively entail
enclosure of the commons, and provide an
opportunity for these larger and better-
resourced farmers to monopolise access, as is
the case on the new farms.
It is questionable whether the Committee
or even the municipality is sufficiently
removed from these local interests to enable it
to act neutrally and in line with the
regulations.
Maintenance of infrastructure
There is ongoing conflict between farmers and
the Municipality over the repair and
maintenance of infrastructure on the new
farms (as well as on the reserve commons).
Prior to 1993, the management and
maintenance of the Leliefontein commons was
financed by central state funding through the
coloured House of Representatives and
through municipal rates and taxes paid by all
reserve residents, whether they used the
commons or not. Since 1994, this situation
has changed. Following an initial transitional
period of provincial government funding, all
central and provincial government funding for
maintenance and management of the commons
has been terminated (SPP, 2003).
Municipalities are now expected to fund the
delivery of services in relation to the commons
from levies raised locally. This levy, or
maintenance fee, will be calculated on the real
costs of maintaining the commons. According
to the municipal development officer, these
levies will be raised only from the users of the
commons, unlike in the past where all
residents paid, whether they used the
commons or not. The development officer
stressed that the municipality will not cross-
subsidise commonage maintenance with other
levies raised locally.
Although in principle farmers do not
disagree with paying for at least some of the
maintenance costs associated with the
commons, what is causing disquiet is the shift
toward aggressive cost-recovery by the
municipality. Currently infrastructure on the
new farms is in a poor condition (although
improving) and farmers have up until now
largely been maintaining pumps and fences
themselves. As a result, they are reluctant to
pay user fees until the infrastructure is
brought up to working order. The
municipality, on the other hand, being in a
financial crisis, holds that the infrastructure
cannot be repaired until farmers start to pay
their fees. This situation has led to an effective
stalemate between farmers and the
municipality, with neither side willing to shift
its position. As a result, some of the farmers
on the new farms have not been paying their
fees, with a similar situation prevailing on the
old commons.
What infuriates farmers is that the
municipality, despite being unable to fix the
infrastructure because of financial constraints,
will not allow farmers to undertake
maintenance of municipal property. Farmers
on the new farms say they are more than
Box 9: Municipal levies
‘The municipality is quick to take money, but have done nothing in return such as fixing
water pumps for example. The farmers generally fix things themselves. They are supposed to
go to MK, who then go to the municipality to report these problems, and then the
municipality is meant to come out and fix it. This, however, never happens. One of the
reasons that the municipality has no money is that they spend most of their budget on
salaries.’
Small farmer on the Paulshoek commons (May 2003)
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willing (and capable) to do much of the
maintenance work themselves, but they need
permission and material support from the
municipality to do this.30 This situation is
leading to growing resentment and the
perception that the municipality is only there
to extract money from local residents.
Suspicions have also been voiced about what
happens to the money that farmers pay. The
perception is that the money must be going
towards the high salaries that municipal
officials are allegedly paid.
How this issue is going to be resolved is
yet to be seen. In discussions with municipal
officials, there has been talk of applying for a
Commonage Infrastructure Grant to repair
and upgrade infrastructure on the new farms.
However, ongoing maintenance will still prove
a problem since the levies raised from users of
the commons are likely to be inadequate to
cover these costs, a fact the municipality
acknowledges.
Endnotes
24 Okiep and Carolusberg are both mining
settlements located around Springbok
approximately 120 km north of Leliefontein.
25 It is important to note that some farmers also have
cattle and donkeys on the new farms. These large
stock units have been converted to their equivalent
in small stock units. The tabulated stock data in
Annex 1 provides the conversion ratios used in this
process.
26 In discussions with small farmers remaining on the
old commons, there is some bitterness about this.
As small farmers they are unable to access similar
financial assistance because they lack collateral
and any form of credit record.
27 Source: 2002 Department of Agriculture dipping
figures for the new farms of Leliefontein.
28 The two successful applicants from Paulshoek are
a good illustration of this. The one is the convenor
of the Paulshoek Commonage Committee and runs
a general store in the village. This individual
secured finance from the state’s Land Bank in late
2003 to buy stock for his newly allocated camp (yet
he was not actively farming for most of 2003). The
other applicant is permanently employed in
Springbok and only returns to Paulshoek on
weekends. He, however, remains prominent in
local politics and development processes, in part
through his association with regional structures of
the African National Congress.
29 The camp is currently unallocated because the
previous lessee withdrew his stock (allegedly due
to the water problem).
30 In practice, farmers do what they can to keep the
infrastructure on the new farms up and running.
They cannot farm without water, hence they




As discussed in the Introduction, thereare multiple, and perhapscontradictory objectives and
motivations informing the acquisition of the
new farms at Leliefontein.
At a national policy level, the objectives
are related to supporting both subsistence and
aspirant commercial farmers in the
Leliefontein communal area: the former
through opening access to additional grazing
resources for small and poor farmers in order
to support food security, and the latter through
the new farms acting as stepping-stones in the
transition of these farmers to full commercial
status on their own land outside of the
communal areas.
Local stakeholders, including the
municipality and NGOs, share these
livelihood and development objectives. At the
local level, however, there are additional
motivations at play. These relate to
transforming commonage management
practices – ostensibly to avoid a perceived
‘tragedy of the commons’. Central to this
transformation is the crafting of an
institutional framework in which individual
users can be held accountable for the full
costs of their land use.
Livelihood support and farmer
development
Support to subsistence users
It is clear from this research that small
farmers from Leliefontein (i.e. farmers with
50 head of stock or less) are, on the whole,
not directly benefiting through access to the
new farms. This is despite the fact that access
regulations were initially in favour of the
poor, with a maximum stock limit and income
ceiling set for access to the new farms.
Practically, there are two factors
prohibiting the use of the new farms by these
farmers. The first is location and problems in
physically accessing the farms. The second,
which compounds the issue of physical
access, is the land use approach and the bias
of this approach in favour of those farmers
with resources and larger herds. Unless a
farmer has a herd that is large enough to
ensure an annual off-take sufficient to meet
the financial obligations associated with this
system, or has alternative sources of income,
it is not cost-effective to use the new farms as
currently constituted. However, instead of
seeking solutions to these obstacles, the
municipality and the Commonage Committee
have simply adjusted the management
framework to cater for a different beneficiary
group – one that has the necessary resources.
Thus, the stock limit was increased and the
income ceiling removed to allow a wealthier
group of farmers’ access to the land.
An alternative solution would have been to
adopt a different land use approach – one in
which the new farms are seen as a real
expansion of the old commons, rather than as
an individualised leasehold scheme. Adopting
the new farms as an expanded common and
allowing stock posts and farmer mobility
would be an alternative that would allow
5. Discussion
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small farmers to benefit from this land and for
far greater flexibility of use. For example,
during the winter of 2003 (which was a
drought year), many small farmers would
have welcomed the opportunity to move at
least their breeding stock onto the new farms
(where there was forage) in order to survive
the winter. De-stocking in this way would also
have taken some pressure off the old commons
during the winter rainfall period, allowing the
veld some rest and recovery before the
animals moved back.
Under the current framework, however,
this is not possible, as the time frames and
process of application, as well as the camp-
based leasehold scheme, is too cumbersome
and inflexible to accommodate the more
random and flexible access requirements of
many farmers. This is problematic since rapid
response and flexible approaches are key in
arid/semi-arid settings if opportunistic
strategies are to operate efficiently.
Where negotiations must happen in
response to a sudden change in the
local situation, and new and flexible
contracts must be formed due to
unexpected circumstances, institutions
derived from a complex interplay of
individual and group interaction based
on negotiation of rights within and
between social networks are likely to
be the most effective at managing
resource access in such dynamic
ecological settings. (Scoones, 1999:
222)
The formalised and structured approach
adopted for the new farms may thus be too
inflexible, cumbersome and unwieldy to adapt
to unpredictable and rapidly changing
circumstances.31
There are, however, two factors that
militate against such a shift in favour of the
poor. In the first place, the policy environment
is hostile to the needs of the rural poor.
Specifically, there has been a growing bias in
policy since the 2000 Ministerial review of
land reform, with an increasing focus on
support to emergent farmers (i.e. aspirant
commercial farmers) through the LRAD
programme, in particular. This shift in focus
has seen a de-emphasis of alternative land
redistribution options such as municipal
commonage.32
This commercial production/emergent
farmer bias reinforces the already dominant
‘tragedy’ narrative (and the associated
prescriptions for range management) in
relation to communal tenure and communal
farming in South Africa. This narrative is
deep-rooted within government bureaucracies
(particular those dealing with agriculture and
natural resource management), the
commercial farming sector, and many NGOs.
Even at a local level, among communal
farmers themselves, the tragedy narrative is
often strongly internalised.
 The second factor relates to the local
politics of decision-making in Leliefontein
itself. Having monopolised the new commons,
and as the newly established management
institution, it is unlikely that the current
beneficiary group will give up the new farms
without a struggle. In any event, these
individuals are well placed in their local
communities (and indeed in Namaqualand
more broadly) and other interest groups too
poorly organised to sway their current hold.
Moreover, in as much as the small farmers on
the old commons complain about this ‘elite
capture’, they admit that they themselves are
not organised, and as a result are not able to
speak with a single voice. Their lack of
organisation as an interest group means they
are not heard. Under the co-management
framework the municipality – despite possible
good intentions – is spread far too thin to
provide the kind of support needed to ensure
that the poor are fairly represented. At one
level then, the ease with which the new
management institution has been captured by
local elites could be seen as the municipality
handing over responsibility for tasks it has no
capacity to deal with to a group that has the
will and motivation to do so.
At another level, however, the role of the
municipality may be less neutral and more
interest driven. After all, a number of key
municipal officials are themselves part of the
Leliefontein elite. Moreover, the tragedy
narrative and discourses of agricultural
modernisation feature prominently in their
thinking. These individuals largely share the
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negative view of communal farming held by
many members of the Commonage
Committee.
Stepping-stone for aspirant commercial
farmers
The main direct beneficiaries of the new farms
have proven to be middle to larger reserve
farmers with herds of 50 animals or more and
sufficient financial resources to operate within
a commercial rangeland management model.
Although there is a maximum stock limit of
200 small stock units set for the each farmer
on the new farms, a sizeable minority of these
farmers have in excess of 200 small stock
units.
From a livelihood point of view, the
prognosis has been positive for these farmers.
Herd sizes have increased on the new farms
(in some cases substantially) and these
farmers suffered relatively negligible losses
during the winter drought of 2003, when herds
on the old commons were decimated.
This positive livelihood outcome does need
to be qualified, however. There is evidence
that these benefits may prove short-lived.
Many of the camps on the new farms have
been standing empty for a number of years
and there has effectively been no grazing on
this land. As a result, when new farmers came
onto this land they found extensive forage for
their stock. At the Commonage Committee
meeting in May 2004, however, a number of
Committee members reported that farmers
were running short of grazing in their camps.
This was especially true of those camps that
are dominated by grasses (as opposed to a
mix of grasses, succulent and other shrubby
vegetation). A number of farmers in such
camps have noted that the grasses only
provide grazing for approximately five
months after the rains.
Although this issue has just arisen (and
needs to be monitored and investigated
further), it may be an indication that the
camp-based land use model adopted for the
new farms is not wholly appropriate given the
arid/semi-arid environment in Leliefontein. As
noted above, the mainstream range
management approach adopted for the new
farms may be unable to manage the
uncertainty and variability associated with the
commons of Leliefontein. According to
Behnke and Scoones (1993), livestock
movement plays an important role in such
highly variable environments. If a herd is
confined to one place, livestock numbers and
productivity are limited by the scarcest
resource in the scarcest season. In highly
variable systems, the costs of immobility can
thus be high: one unfavourable period can
limit production irrespective of an abundance
of resources in other periods. Here, effective
management is about responding flexibly to
stress rather than preventing flexibility.
Movement is thus a means of circumventing
stress under certain ecological conditions
(Behnke & Scoones, 1993). From this point of
view, the stockpost system and associated
opportunistic grazing strategies of communal
farmers in Namaqualand may not be as
irrational as is often depicted, and may
represent rather a logical response to farming
under arid/semi-arid and highly variable
conditions.
In terms of the new farms acting as
stepping-stones, however, it is apparent from
the case study that the new farms process has
failed in this regard.  This is due largely to a
misconception surrounding the nature of
communal farming and the livelihood
strategies of these farmers. Very few farmers
in Leliefontein (including those that have
gained access to the new farms) are full-time
farmers with aspirations to commercial
production. Livestock plays a different role in
the livelihoods of Leliefontein residents.
Traditionally, young working-age adults
leave the communal areas of Namaqualand in
search of employment within the regional
economy. A land base that is inadequate to
provide sufficient economic opportunity
through farming alone necessitates this
migrancy. The communal areas, however,
remain a critical place of refuge for those
between jobs, thus enabling residents to
weather the vagaries of the regional labour
market. Moreover, these areas are the place to
which people return in late middle and old age
to see out their ‘retirement’. It is really only at
this time in people’s lives that land-based
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livelihoods come to the fore. Many migrant
workers invest their savings in livestock
during the course of their working lives, with
animals being kept with the herds of family
members residing in the communal areas. It is
only on returning to Leliefontein that these
individuals become farmers as such, and even
then many derive income from other sources
such as state pensions or other welfare
payments, or small enterprises. This
characteristic of Namaqualand farming is
illustrated by the age profile of farmers: more
than fifty per cent of farmers are over the age
of sixty.
It is therefore not surprising that in
discussions with farmers (on the new farms
and on the old commons) none expressed a
desire to move out of the communal areas and
set off as independent commercial producers.
All are aware that setting out alone would
result in a number of costs being internalised
at their full market value. Infrastructure
investment, repair and maintenance for
example would all become the responsibility
of the private farmer. There are far too many
benefits deriving from farming on communal
land to create much of an incentive for
farmers to move out of Leliefontein. And in
any event, it is difficult to see the DLA (or
any other institution) providing support to an
emergent farmer who is 60 or 70 years old.
Ironically, the largest farmer in Leliefontein
(one of the 20 largest communal farmers in
Namaqualand), and the only respondent to
express a willingness to give up his grazing
rights in the reserve and move onto a
privately-owned farm, has been denied access
to the new farms for being too large. This
farmer is young and would prove a perfect
candidate for the stepping-stone approach. In
July 2003, he had more than 500 head of
stock requiring at least 6000 hectares of land,
making him an ideal candidate for a
commercial farm.
If the stepping-stone approach is to be
seriously pursued, there is a need for the
process to be more adequately conceptualised.
Policies would have to be put in place that
clearly defines who the beneficiaries of such a
scheme would be and on what basis they
would be selected. Policy would also need to
clearly articulate what it is that these farmers
are to achieve on the new farms, and when
and under what conditions they would exit the
stepping-stone scheme and through LRAD
acquire a private farm for commercial farming
purposes. Without such clarity at an
institutional and policy level, it is almost
inevitable that any scheme of this sort will be
captured by those best positioned to do so.
The system of leasehold as currently
constituted on the new farms will clearly not
achieve this objective.
Creating legally robust and effective
resource management institutions
The municipality, farmers and other
stakeholders at Leliefontein see overstocking
as a central factor in the degradation of the
reserve commons, and the communal farming
system that prevails as the primary cause of
this.
In order to ensure sustainable use of the
new farms and to avoid this land going the
same way as the old commons, a land use
model based on commercial range
management practices has been adopted, and
is being implemented within a co-management
institutional framework. This co-management
approach to natural resource management is
strongly ‘new institutionalist’ in character,
with an emphasis on the ‘crafting’ of
institutions (seen largely as rules and
regulations) to constrain the inherent self-
interest of individual users of the commons.
This co-management approach, in association
with the camp-based, quasi-commercial
system which strongly emphasises stocking
rates, is intended to enable easy monitoring,
control, and the holding to account of
individual commonage users.
This case study, however, raises a number
of concerns in relation to the viability of this
institutional approach particularly because, as
illustrated, the land management system is
already being flouted at a number of levels.
Of importance here, given the stated concern
with stock numbers and sustainability, is that
the fundamental tool for managing stock
numbers (namely carrying capacity) is not




In crafting this new management
institution, through placing too much
emphasis on the technical process of creating
rules and regulations, inadequate attention has
been paid to local interests and community
politics relating to resource access in
particular. The resultant marginalisation of
the poor is partly a consequence of this, as
local elites have engaged with the dominant
discourse of range management that has
informed the new farms framework and
subverted this to their own ends. The ‘tragedy
of the commons’ narrative and associated
prescriptions of enclosure and privatisation is
meaningful to the current beneficiaries of the
new farms only in so far as it furthers their
own personal interest in privatising the
commons, or in introducing non-communal
forms of tenure.
The municipality has been unable to
provide a counterbalance to these elite
interests. This is due to the fact that many of
these wealthier farmers are directly involved
in municipal functions through Commonage
Committees and linked to the incomplete
process of democratic decentralisation which
has devolved a range of developmental
functions and responsibilities to the local
government level but not the requisite
capacity, power, authority or budgets to
adequately deal with these. The problem of
elite capture and non-enforcement will
probably only worsen with the conversion of
the Commonage Committee to a municipal
entity as the oversight function of the
municipality will now be even further
removed from the community. As things
currently stand, the co-management approach
ironically is in danger of falling prey to the
same kinds of problems experienced with
private CPA ownership in other land
redistribution options and restitution projects.
Endnotes
31 This is not to idealise the system currently in place
on the old commons. There are very real problems
that need to be addressed and in some areas the
management system has broken down completely.
32 There has been a reduction in the scale of delivery
since 2000, but also restrictions in terms of 2003–
2005 Medium Term Expenditure Framework
budget projections. See Anderson & Pienaar, 2003.
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With the weakness of the co-management institution and theevident self-interest of many of its
members, the land use model and co-
management institutional framework have
largely failed to achieve any of the objectives
set for the new farms. Thus, both subsistence
farmers and those large farmers most
appropriate for the ‘stepping-stone’ approach
have effectively been excluded from the
scheme, and the new framework is providing
no guarantee that stocking rates on the new
farms will not reach levels similar to those on
the old commons in the short to medium term.
The fact that the institutional framework
for the new farms has been in place for less
than four years and only fully operational for
the last two of these years does, however, need
to be noted. The same applies to the
municipality, which as an institution is equally
young having only been established in 2000.
As the local government decentralisation
process unfolds, more resources may be made
available to boost the capacity of the
municipality to play a more decisive and pro-
active role in managing the commons (and in
poverty alleviation more broadly). If the
building of natural resource management
regimes is viewed as an iterative process, then
there needs to be space for learning and space
for making mistakes. As Ostrom (1996) notes
in her discussion of long-standing and
sophisticated common property systems in
Switzerland and Japan, these systems were
not created by single sweeping administrative
reforms – there was a great deal of trial-and-
error and contestation over long periods of
time in establishing the current configurations
of these systems.
In addressing the needs of the poor,
however, the greatest obstacle may well prove
to be one of mindsets. Whether policy- and
decision-makers can move beyond the mould
of agricultural modernisation, and its
associated attachment to private/individual
land ownership and land use based on
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Interviews and discussions with
individuals / Observation of Commonage
Committee and local Farmers Union
meetings
Person/Organisation Date Description
Sakkie van der Paul • 14 November 2003 Department of Agriculture official
• 6 May 2003 who sits in the Leliefontein Commonage
Committee. He is based in Springbok.
Johan Johannes • 22 July 2003 Department of Agriculture official
who works with Sakkie van der  Paul.
Emerging commercial farmer from
Steinkopf and member of Steinkopf
Farmers Association.
Louis van Wyk • 4 February 2003 Municipal official responsible for
• 21 July 2003 the Leliefontein commons. Convenes
• 17 November 2003 the Leliefontein Commonage
• 5 May 2004 Committee. Resides and farms in
Leliefontein village.
John Smith • 19 November 2003 Convenor of the Nourivier Commonage
Committee. Farmer on the new farms
(2003 and 2004), and shopkeeper in
Nourivier.
Sarah Donkerman • 18 November 2003 Member of Kamasies commonage
committee. Has two camps on
Tweefontein.
Dan Engelbrecht • 5 February 2003 Convenor of Paulshoek commonage
• 19 November 2003 committee. Has recently been allocated
• 6 May 2003 a camp on the new farms for 2004.
Runs a shop in Paulshoek.
Mr Lombard • 22 July 2003 Farmer from Rooifontein using the new
farms. Was a beneficiary under the
previous economic unit policy.
Fonkie Claassen • 16 November 2003 Stock farmer in Paulshoek. Rents
accommodation to visiting researchers.
Sampie Cloete • 15 November 2003 Stock farmer in Paulshoek. Does part-
• 26 May 2003 time work for an outside research
• 20 July 2003 project.
Japie Claassen • 6 February 2003 Paulshoek stock farmer who spent
• 19 July 2003 some time on new farms, but returned.
Gert ‘Keteltjie’ Joseph • 18 July 2003 Paulshoek stock farmer.
• 16 November 2003
Mervin Cloete • 17 November 2003 Prominent resident and stock farmer
from Paulshoek who is employed full
time in Springbok. Has gained access to
the new farms for 2004.
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Person/Organisation Date Description
Harry Nel • 18 November 2003 Large Rooifontein stock farmer and
entrepreneur. Runs approx. 500 stock
on old commons.
Kameelkrans Farmers • 18 July 2003 Independent farmers union recently
Union meeting established in Leliefontein.
Leliefontein Commonage • 22 July 2003 (held in Reserve commonage committee
Committee meeting Nourivier) comprising two reps each from the
• 14 November 2003 (held different village MKs.
in Garies)
• 6 May 2004 (held in
Garies)
4. Stock Data
Department of Veterinary Services, Northern
Cape Provincial Department of
Agriculture. 2002. Stock data, Leliefontein
communal area. Unpublished.
5. Farm Maps
Department of Agriculture and Water Supply
(Farm Planning), Northern Cape. 1997.
Plan for the farm Boesmanplaat (Farm
Plan no. 5/214/005404/6).
Department of Agriculture (Technical
Services), Northern Cape. 1972. Plan for
the farm Couragiesfontein/De Riet 2
(Farm Plan no. B/11/1/258).
Department of Agriculture, Northern Cape.
Date unknown. Plan for the farm De Riet
2 (Farm Plan no. B 1124/1/166).
Department of Agriculture (Technical
Services: Farm Planning), Northern Cape.
2001. Plan for the farm Doorndraai/
Papkuilsfontein (Farm Plan no. 2/732/
011555/0).
Department of Agriculture (Technical
Services: Farm Planning), Northern Cape.
1989. Plan for the farm Tweefontein (no
Farm Plan number).
Ongoing and informal (telephonic, e-mail, and
one-on-one discussions) were held
throughout 2003 with individuals of the
Legal Resources Centre and of the Surplus
People Project. Both organisations are




Memorandum of Understanding between
the Kamiesberg Municipality and the
Leliefontein Commonage Committee.
Minutes, Leliefontein Commonage Committee
meeting, 25 November 2003.
Minutes, Leliefontein Commonage Committee
meeting, 17 February 2004.
2004 Grazing Contracts (for 23 farmers
using the new farms; contracts dated
February 2004).
2004 Grazing Register for the New Farms,
Leliefontein Commonage Committee
(handwritten document circa February
2004).
